COMMENTS
High Hopes Hamstrung: How the “Trial De Novo” for
Termination of Tenured Teachers’ Contracts Undermines
School Reform in Oklahoma*
I. Introduction
The numbers suggest that Oklahoma’s public elementary and secondary
schools are struggling, both in terms of student performance and in terms of
public investment. A 2007 study commissioned by the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce found that Oklahoma students ranked in the lowest quintile for
overall academic performance relative to their peers nationwide.1 A national
survey of teacher salaries for the 2004–2005 school year revealed that, while
average starting salaries for Oklahoma teachers ranked a promising thirty-third
in the nation at $29,174, the state’s average teacher salary came in a lackluster
forty-seventh at $37,879.2 More recently, a 2009 U.S. Census Bureau report
revealed Oklahoma’s annual per-pupil investment—$7420—to be among the
five lowest in the country, well below the national average of $9666 per
student.3
* The author wishes to dedicate this comment to her parents, James and Nedra Koen
Roye, whose combined classroom teaching experience—totaling nearly seventy years—has
always embodied the highest ideals of the teaching profession and continually inspires the
author to advocate for public education. The author also wishes to express her sincere gratitude
to Miami High School teacher Jamie Stephens and University of Oklahoma law professor Mary
Sue Backus for their insightful assistance during the drafting of this comment.
1. INST. FOR A COMPETITIVE WORKFORCE, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, LEADERS AND
LAGGARDS: A STATE-BY-STATE REPORT CARD ON EDUCATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 47, 64-65
(2007), available at http://www.uschamber.com/reportcard/default (follow “Downloads” dropdown menu; then follow “Report PDF” hyperlink).
2. Press Release, Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Oklahoma Ranks 47th in the Nation for Teacher
Pay (Mar. 29, 2007), available at http://archive.aft.org/presscenter/releases/2007/statereleases/
SalarySurvey-OK.pdf. For the state-mandated minimum salary schedules for school years
2005–2006 through 2007–2008, see 70 OKLA. STAT. § 18-114.12 (Supp. 2007), which indicates
a slight increase in minimum starting pay for Oklahoma teachers in recent years—up over
$3500 to $31,600. But see Okla. State Dep’t of Educ., Oklahoma PK-12 Education
Highlights–National Rankings, http://sde.state.ok.us/Services/NatRank/default.html (last visited
Mar. 30, 2010) (indicating that in 2007–2008 the overall average teacher salary in the
state—$43,551—still lagged well behind both the regional and national averages, which the
National Education Association (NEA) calculated at $45,172 and $52,308, respectively).
3. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PUBLIC EDUCATION FINANCES 2007, at xiii (2009), available at
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/school/07f33pub.pdf; see also Okla. State Dep’t of Educ., supra
note 2 (citing NEA data indicating that the 2007–2008 per-pupil expenditure average for states
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If these figures provided the only lenses through which to assess
Oklahoma’s prospects for success in public education, the educational future
of the state might look bleak. Fortunately, a few bright spots exist as well.
Oklahoma is widely recognized as a leader in early childhood education,
ranking first in the nation, according to the National Institute for Early
Education Research, for the percentage of four-year-olds who have access to
free prekindergarten programs.4 And in 2008, Oklahoma emerged as the state
with the fifth-highest percentage of teachers who had achieved national
certification from the National Board for Professional Teaching Standards
(NBPTS).5 By that year, 5.7% of the total teacher workforce in the state had
acquired national certification, compared with the nationwide average of just
2%.6
These figures represent some of the raw materials needed to spur
sustainable educational improvement in this state. The number of teachers
pursuing and achieving national certification is especially encouraging,
because high quality teachers are unquestionably essential to the educational
in Oklahoma’s region was $8870). Moreover, in 2007, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that
it lacked the authority to issue a mandate to the state legislature to increase educational funding.
See Okla. Educ. Ass’n v. State ex rel. Okla. Legislature, 2007 OK 30, ¶¶ 25-26, 158 P.3d 1058,
1066 (finding that petitioners lacked standing and that the complaint stated a political question
suited for resolution by the legislature, not the courts).
4. NAT’L INST. FOR EARLY EDUC. RESEARCH, RUTGERS GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., THE
STATE OF PRESCHOOL 2008, at 6, 112 (2008), available at http://nieer.org/yearbook/pdf/
yearbook.pdf; see also OKLA. STATE DEP’T OF EDUC., OKLA. EARLY CHILDHOOD PROGRAMS
2007 STATE REPORT (2008), available at http://sde.state.ok.us/Programs/ECEduc/pdf/Report.
pdf (providing early childhood education statistics for the state as well as a chronology of the
legislation that undergirds Oklahoma’s early education programs).
5. Okla. State Dep’t of Educ., supra note 2.
6. Id.; see also Press Release, Nat’l Bd. for Prof’l Teaching Standards, Education Reform
Takes Major Step Forward with Announcement of 9,600 New National Board Certified
Teachers in 2008 (Dec. 9, 2008), available at http://www.nbpts.org/about_us/news_media/
press_releases?ID=462. This considerably higher rate of national certification for Oklahoma
teachers is likely attributable, in part, to the legislature’s provision of a $5000 annual
supplemental stipend for those teachers who achieve NBPTS certification. See 70 OKLA. STAT.
§ 6-204.2(J) (2001). Achieving national certification is one of the few ways by which
Oklahoma teachers can increase their professional compensation beyond the traditional lockstep
salary schedules set by the legislature and local school boards. Compare 70 OKLA. STAT. § 18114.12 (setting forth the statewide minimum salary schedule for varying degree levels and
basing compensation increases solely on years of service), with Denver Pub. Sch., Welcome to
Teacher ProComp, http://denverprocomp.dpsk12.org/about/ (follow “2009-10 ProComp
Elements Chart” hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (describing the Denver Public Schools
negotiated teacher compensation plan providing for differentiated compensation based on a
variety of factors, including professional development, student performance, and instruction in
hard-to-serve schools or hard-to-staff positions).
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success of students.7 But the kind of rigorous teaching standards embodied in
the NBPTS certification process are far from universal throughout the state.
In fact, the National Council on Teacher Quality’s most recent state-by-state
analysis assigns Oklahoma’s overall teacher-quality policies—including those
related to teacher licensure, evaluation, and compensation—a grade of “D+,”
characterizing these policies as “in need of improvement.”8 This kind of
assessment suggests that the baseline for teacher performance in the state may
be too low to support widespread, long-term gains in the educational success
of Oklahoma students.
Moreover, this comment proceeds on the premise that even if every teacher
in the state attained national certification, sustainable, across-the-board gains
in student performance are unlikely to materialize. Because an exclusive focus
on the “quality” of individual teachers (and their individual efforts) does not
provide a mechanism for systematically addressing the profound social,
cultural, and structural challenges that schools face today, something more is
needed.9 Part of this “something more” involves a thorough reexamination
and reconceptualization of the role of the teacher. Specifically, this
reconceptualization involves expanding the vision of what the professional
work of teaching entails to include ongoing collaborative research, practice,
and reflection aimed at addressing the concrete educational challenges teachers
face in their own schools.10
Of particular importance in the context of any such reconceptualization is
the statutory framework that governs how school districts evaluate teachers’
performance and how school boards make employment decisions on the basis
of those evaluations. This comment describes Oklahoma’s legal framework
for teacher evaluation and continued employment, exploring the extent to
which this framework supports or impedes efforts to advance teachers’
instructional effectiveness—and, by extension, student learning—in
accordance with an expanded vision of teaching practice. On its broadest
level, this comment addresses two interrelated questions: First, what must
reform-minded educators and educational leaders—teachers, administrators,
and school boards alike—do to foster an expanded vision of teaching practice
in a way that comports with the existing statutory and regulatory framework
7. See Linda Gorman, Good Teachers Raise Student Achievement, http://www.nber.org/
digest/aug05/w11154.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) (citing Eric A. Hanushek et al., The
Market for Teacher Quality (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11154,
2005)).
8. NAT’L COUNCIL ON TEACHER QUALITY, 2009 STATE TEACHER POLICY YEARBOOK 88
(2009), available at http://www.nctq.org/stpy09/reports/stpy_national.pdf.
9. See discussion infra Part II.
10. See discussion infra Part II.
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for teacher evaluation and due process? The exploration of this first question
highlights the legal challenges that the current framework poses for educators
seeking to lay a foundation for long-term school improvement measures. In
light of these challenges, the second question asks, what changes should the
statutory and regulatory framework undergo in order to better facilitate the
kinds of improvements in teachers’ professional and instructional practice that
can support sustainable gains in student learning across the state?
Part II sets the stage for delving into these questions by surveying recent
educational research that establishes the indispensable role that local, teacherdriven school reform efforts can and must play in the overall drama of
educational reform in this country. This Part describes and advocates
expanding the vision of what constitutes the professional work of
teachers—from one almost exclusively focused on the efforts of individual
teachers in their individual classrooms to one that encompasses continuous,
collaborative professional problem-solving at the school and district level. In
light of the research supporting this expanded vision of teaching, Part III then
analyzes Oklahoma’s current statutory framework for teacher evaluations,11
asking whether and under what conditions school districts may go so far as to
incorporate into their evaluation instruments a requirement that all teachers
engage in ongoing professional collaboration toward site- and district-based
improvement. This Part sets forth the legal analysis supporting the conclusion
that school districts can incorporate such a requirement. This Part also
explains why school districts can implement a professional collaboration
requirement without first negotiating for such a provision with local teachers’
unions.
Part IV then examines how such a requirement would fare if challenged
under the Teacher Due Process Act of 199012 (the Act) by a tenured teacher
subject to contract termination on the basis of failure to meet the professional
collaboration requirement.13 This Part analyzes the Act and ultimately
contends that the standard of review under which the Act requires a court to
11. See 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101.10 to -101.11 (2001).
12. 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101.20 to -101.30 (2001 & Supp. 2009) (originally enacted as Act
of Apr. 25, 1990, ch. 2, §§ 76-85, 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws (Supp.) 167, 221).
13. The state legislature ostensibly abolished teacher tenure when it enacted the Teacher
Due Process Act as part of its comprehensive 1989–1990 education reform bill, commonly
known as House Bill 1017. See id. In reality, the Act simply altered the terminology used to
describe those teachers upon whom the law confers heightened due process rights after a
specified number of years of satisfactory service. Such teachers are now termed “career”
teachers rather than “tenured” teachers. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.3 (2001 & Supp. 2009).
Following the lead of the Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, this comment uses the term
“tenured” to describe the status of such teachers. See, e.g., Weston v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 35,
2007 OK 61, ¶ 17, 170 P.3d 539, 543.
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review a school board’s contract termination decisions—de novo
review—yields two unfortunate results: (1) it thwarts the efforts of school
districts to raise the professional capacity of their teachers, and (2) it
delegitimizes teachers’ efforts to develop and maintain high professional
standards designed to address the needs of their particular students in their
particular communities. Because de novo review thus undermines these
crucial aspects of school reform, and because it represents a significant
departure from the standard applied to school boards’ employment decisions
in a majority of other states, this Part urges the state legislature to replace the
statutory requirement for a “trial de novo” with a procedure that involves a
more deferential standard of review. Finally, Part V underscores the essential
contribution that sound evaluation and due process policies at the state and
local levels make to the broader enterprise of educational reform in this
country.
II. Teacher Leadership Is Essential to Sustainable School Improvement
For more than two decades, educational theorists, researchers, and
practitioners have forcefully argued that classroom teachers can and must play
a central role in articulating, implementing, and evaluating strategies for
systematically improving student learning.14 Noting the myriad forces that
have relegated teachers to the sidelines in the debate over school reform and
educational improvement in this country,15 especially in the current “age of
accountability,”16 these educational advocates have proposed models of school
14. See, e.g., MARTIN L. KROVETZ & GILBERTO ARRIAZA, COLLABORATIVE TEACHER
LEADERSHIP: HOW TEACHERS CAN FOSTER EQUITABLE SCHOOLS 84 (2006); Karen Carter &
Rob Halsall, Teacher Research for School Improvement, in TEACHER RESEARCH AND SCHOOL
IMPROVEMENT: OPENING DOORS FROM THE INSIDE 71, 75 (Rob Halsall ed., 1998) (applying the
argument for teacher-driven reform in the context of British public education); D’Ette Fly
Cowan, The PLC Connection to School Improvement, in RECULTURING SCHOOLS AS
PROFESSIONAL LEARNING COMMUNITIES 75, 77-78 (Jane Bumpers Huffman & Kristine Kiefer
Hipp eds., 2003) [hereinafter RECULTURING SCHOOLS].
15. See, e.g., Frances K. Kochan & Cynthia J. Reed, Collaborative Leadership, Community
Building, and Democracy in Public Education, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF EDUCATIONAL
LEADERSHIP 68, 69-72 (Fenwick W. English ed., 2005) [hereinafter SAGE HANDBOOK]
(attributing the rise of centralized “accountability” schemes to the decrease in public trust that
evolved from the transformation of schools in the industrial age into large, impersonal, factorylike entities, disassociated with the communities they served and “managed” according to
“scientific” principles that privileged “efficiency” over other values); KROVETZ & ARRIAZA,
supra note 14, at 84 (describing the traditional process by which university researchers conduct
“armchair research projects,” using schools as “objects of study” and casting teachers as
recipients of the limited knowledge generated thereby).
16. Walter F. Heinecke et al., U.S. Schools and the New Standards and Accountability
Initiative, in EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN AN AGE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 7, 29 (Daniel L. Duke
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reform that enable teachers to collaborate with each other, their administrators,
institutions of higher education, and other community stakeholders (e.g.,
parents and business leaders) to collectively and continually generate
knowledge about student learning.17 Essentially, these educational leaders
have advocated a wholesale reconceptualization of the teaching profession
itself—away from the traditional “solo practitioner” model and toward a
highly collaborative professional enterprise model.18
Often referred to as “professional learning communities,” or “PLCs,” these
models eschew the notion that adopting any particular prepackaged, one-sizefits-all program will lead to sustainable school improvement.19 Instead, these
models focus on creating conditions in which teachers themselves can
transform their schools into “systematic, collaborative problem-solving
organizations that can continually develop and implement new ideas” for
achieving better outcomes in student learning.20 Rather than prescribing a
specific plan of action, PLCs seek to cultivate a level of human and
organizational “infrastructure” within individual schools or school districts that
frees teachers to work together to reflect on their own practices, research and
evaluate emerging data, and ultimately devise and implement solutions that are
specifically tailored to the needs they have identified in their own students.21
The gravitational center for PLC school improvement is thus the local
school or school district itself, but this highly localized and highly
contextualized improvement process is not incompatible with rigorous state
and national standards for student performance. In fact, early research on
student outcomes in PLC schools suggests that students in schools where
teachers deliberately and systematically engage in ongoing collaborative study
and self-evaluation progress faster than students in non-PLC schools.22
PLC approaches to school improvement also effectuate the most
fundamental purpose of public education in a democracy: the training of
citizens for civic, democratic participation.23 The call to empower practicing
et al. eds., 2003) (suggesting that the “accountability reforms [of the last decade have been]
driven by political rather than rational or professionally defined educational concerns”).
17. See, e.g., Shirley M. Hord, Professional Learning Communities: An Overview, in
LEARNING TOGETHER, LEADING TOGETHER: CHANGING SCHOOLS THROUGH PROFESSIONAL
LEARNING COMMUNITIES 5, 5-7 (Shirley M. Hord ed., 2004); Kochan & Reed, supra note 15,
at 72-75.
18. See KATHLEEN FULTON ET AL., INDUCTION INTO LEARNING COMMUNITIES 10-16
(2005), available at http://www.nctaf.org/documents/NCTAF_Induction_Paper_2005.pdf.
19. See Hord, supra note 17, at 14.
20. Cowan, supra note 14, at 76-77; see also Hord, supra note 17, at 7-12.
21. See Cowan, supra note 14, at 76, 81.
22. See Hord, supra note 17, at 12-14.
23. See DAVID MATHEWS, WHY PUBLIC SCHOOLS? WHOSE PUBLIC SCHOOLS? WHAT
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teachers to assume a central role in reforming American schools reflects a
profound belief—shared by the early architects of American “common
schooling”—that because education is the primary mechanism for preserving
the capacity of citizens to participate in democracy, the chief end of education
must be to cultivate in students the skills necessary for democratic
engagement.24 Many educators argue vigorously that the current high-stakes
testing climate, with its myopic focus on standardized test scores, runs directly
counter to this goal.25 These educators maintain that such a one-dimensional
educational vision reduces students to mere repositories of discrete
knowledge,26 precluding them from active participation in the construction of
their own knowledge about the world and their place in that world.27 Yet other
educational advocates have suggested that high-stakes testing does not pose
an insurmountable hurdle to democracy-sustaining pedagogical practices, as
long as teachers receive sufficient support in their efforts to do more than
simply “teach to the test.”28
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that high-stakes standardized testing
and democracy-sustaining pedagogy can indeed be reconciled, the question
remains whether students can fully appreciate the connection between
education and democracy if their teachers do not or cannot model robust
democratic participation by collaborating with their own peers to address the
challenges closest to them. As some theorists have suggested, when teachers
are routinely excluded from the decision-making processes that govern their
day-to-day practice, cast as mere conduits for policies and programs developed
by outside “experts” (whether academics, legislators, or administrators),29 their
own levels of familiarity and competence with democratic processes inevitably

EARLY COMMUNITIES HAVE TO TELL US 91 (2003) (describing the early development of the
public school system in Mobile, Alabama).
24. See Kochan & Reed, supra note 15, at 69.
25. See generally ALFIE KOHN, THE CASE AGAINST STANDARDIZED TESTING (2000); DIANE
RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND
CHOICE ARE UNDERMINING EDUCATION (2010); see also SCOTT FRANKLIN ABERNATHY, NO
CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 12 (2007).
26. See Michael M. Grant & Janette R. Hill, Weighing the Risks with the Rewards:
Implementing Student-Centered Pedagogy Within High Stakes Testing, in UNDERSTANDING
TEACHER STRESS IN AN AGE OF ACCOUNTABILITY 19, 20 (Richard Lambert & Christopher
McCarthy eds., 2006) [hereinafter TEACHER STRESS]; see also infra note 163.
27. See CHARLOTTE DANIELSON & THOMAS L. MCGREAL, TEACHER EVALUATION TO
ENHANCE PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE 14-15 (2000) (listing the proposition “that learners construct
their own understanding of the topics they study” as one of the insights that should inform the
criteria for what constitutes good teaching).
28. See, e.g., Grant & Hill, supra note 26, at 36-37; see also KOHN, supra note 25, at 29.
29. See Carter & Halsall, supra note 14, at 74-79.
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languish.30 And if teachers, the very people most directly responsible for
preparing the young for democratic engagement, are not proficient in such
engagement themselves, their ability to foster it in others appears questionable
at best.31 It is at least plausible, therefore, that students will more readily
connect their learning to their roles as democratic citizens when those students
learn from teachers who possess an intimate familiarity with democratic
participation because they marshal it to solve the problems they confront every
day.32
Yet despite the indications of the effectiveness of PLC approaches and the
alignment of those approaches with the most basic democratic ideals, the task
of reorienting schools around teachers’ collective and continuous inquiry into
student improvement faces considerable skepticism on at least two important
fronts. On one hand, some critics have questioned whether teachers are
willing, or even able, to extricate schools (and school districts) from the grip
of teachers’ unions, which these critics have characterized as focused more on
job security for marginally competent adults than on the educational success
of all students.33 On the other hand, teachers and teachers’ unions have warned
that where administrators do not or cannot guarantee the underlying conditions
for engaging in PLC work—most important, sufficient time to collaboratively
reflect on and evaluate teaching practices, student data, and student
work34—the ambitious goals of PLCs devolve into little more than yet another
set of unreasonable demands that teachers are expected to meet without
adequate resources, support, and compensation.35
Both of these criticisms contain a measure of truth, and each underscores
crucial aspects of the rationale underlying PLCs. A PLC advocate might
respond to the latter set of concerns—those raised by teachers’ unions—by
emphasizing the basic congruence of PLC approaches with the interests
teachers have traditionally looked to unions to protect. The push to develop
PLCs affirms that education is fundamentally a human enterprise, carried out
30. See ABERNATHY, supra note 25, at 12.
31. See Deborah Meier, Educating a Democracy, in WILL STANDARDS SAVE PUBLIC
EDUCATION? 3, 4-5 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2000).
32. See id.
33. See, e.g., MYRON LIEBERMAN, THE TEACHER UNIONS: HOW THE NEA AND AFT
SABOTAGE REFORM AND HOLD STUDENTS, PARENTS, TEACHERS, AND TAXPAYERS HOSTAGE TO
BUREAUCRACY 29-30 (1997); see also PETER BRIMELOW, THE WORM IN THE APPLE: HOW
TEACHER UNIONS ARE DESTROYING AMERICAN EDUCATION 173-74 (2003).
34. See Anita M. Pankake & Gayle Moller, Overview of Professional Learning
Communities, in RECULTURING SCHOOLS, supra note 14, at 3, 13.
35. See Sandra Mathison & Melissa Freeman, Teacher Stress and High Stakes Testing:
How Using One Measure of Academic Success Leads to Multiple Teacher Stressors, in
TEACHER STRESS, supra note 26, at 43, 50, 61.
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by human beings who can, will, and must channel their greatest intellectual
and moral strengths toward maximizing the capacities of the next generation.36
But like teachers’ unions, PLC models also presume that those human beings,
those teachers, can only fulfill their mission if the material conditions under
which they work do not lead down the path to burnout, apathy, and attrition.37
On a very practical level, then, the advocates of PLCs embrace the basic
premise of teachers’ unions’ reservations—namely, that a teacher-driven
school improvement paradigm is doomed to collapse under its own weight in
the absence of conditions that support teachers’ investment in the work of
improvement, such as reasonable schedules, manageable workloads, and
professional pay.
The PLC advocate’s response to the critics of teachers’ unions is somewhat
more complex. These critics often contend that teachers’ unions, because of
their traditionally narrow focus on “the social and economic welfare of their
members,”38 will resist any serious efforts to facilitate teacher leadership for
school improvement if such efforts are not directly tied to “bread and butter”
benefits for teachers themselves.39 Two observations speak to this concern.
First, some teachers’ unions themselves—most notably, the National
Education Association—have publically embraced the notion of teacher
leadership for school reform at both the macrolevel of policy articulation and
the microlevel of site-based solutions to specific student learning challenges.40
These advocates of “New Unionism” have sought to redefine teachers’ unions
as truly professional organizations, guided primarily by a commitment to
quality educational service.41 This view of unions does not dismiss traditional
union functions out-of-hand, but it does cast them as woefully incomplete,
recognizing that while “[c]ollective bargaining legitimated teachers’ economic
36. See Christopher McCarthy & Richard Lambert, Helping Teachers Balance Demands
and Resources in an Era of Accountability, in TEACHER STRESS, supra note 26, at 215, 222; see
also Michael E. Dantley, Moral Leadership: Shifting the Management Paradigm, in SAGE
HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 34.
37. Cf. MIKE BOTTERY, THE CHALLENGES OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP 12-16 (2004)
(describing work patterns for school administrators that have led to marked decreases in
qualified persons seeking school leadership positions throughout the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia).
38. Todd A. DeMitchell & Casey D. Cobb, Commentary, Teachers: Their Union and Their
Profession. A Tangled Relationship, 212 Educ. L. Rep. (West) 1, 2-3 (2006) (quoting Albert
S. Tannenbaum, Unions, in HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZATIONS 709 (James March ed., 1965)).
39. Id. at 7.
40. See generally DON CAMERON, THE INSIDE STORY OF THE TEACHER REVOLUTION IN
AMERICA 171-78 (2005).
41. See, e.g., CHARLES TAYLOR KERCHNER ET AL., UNITED MIND WORKERS: UNIONS AND
TEACHING IN THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 8, 59-75 (1997).
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interests, . . . it never recognized them as experts about learning.”42 Thus, the
task of teachers’ unions in the twenty-first century, according to these union
leaders, is to assist teachers in “organizing” around issues of improvement
within the teaching profession and to ensure that teachers’ expertise regarding
student learning is brought to bear in local, state, and national conversations
about the future of education.43 Taken at face value, this mission appears to
dovetail seamlessly with the goals of PLCs and thus does not seem to pose a
threat to teacher-driven school reform.
Nevertheless, a host of skeptics has questioned the authenticity of this “New
Unionism,”44 and only careful scrutiny of how unions actually implement the
rhetoric of professionalism will reveal whether the skeptics’ doubts are well
founded. But even if unions remain entrenched in outmoded adversarial
postures, a second observation regarding any potential union resistance
emerges: the impetus for most teachers to adhere to traditional union agendas
may largely evaporate in schools that judiciously foster PLC practices.
Healthy PLCs dismantle traditional school hierarchies, reconceptualizing
school leadership as a collective endeavor to be shared by teachers and
administrators, rather than as an activity within the exclusive purview of a few
“managers” who “control” the people and activities within schools.45
Consequently, genuine PLCs may effectively neutralize the typical “us versus
them” or “labor versus management” stance that some teachers’ unions have
historically taken,46 simply by rendering it irrelevant to teachers’ felt concerns.
Such neutralization depends, of course, on the ability of formal school
leaders, primarily principals, to build teachers’ capacity to assume the levels
of responsibility and engagement required to sustain continuous, teacherdriven school improvement.47 And building such capacity takes time and
patient dedication. Expecting improvements from school faculty prematurely
can ground the entire enterprise before takeoff.48 Also, people in formally
recognized school leadership positions must not mistake collaborative school
leadership for the mere delegation or distribution of administrative tasks. Such
42. Id. at 7.
43. See id. at 8.
44. See, e.g., BRIMELOW, supra note 33, at 172-93; see also LIEBERMAN, supra note 33, at
29-46 (examining sample committee mandates and policy resolutions adopted by the National
Education Association and the American Federation of Teachers in the mid-1990s).
45. See GORDON A. DONALDSON, JR., CULTIVATING LEADERSHIP IN SCHOOLS:
CONNECTING PEOPLE, PURPOSE, AND PRACTICE 4-5, 7-10 (2006); KROVETZ & ARRIAZA, supra
note 14, at 2-4.
46. See DeMitchell & Cobb, supra note 38, at 3-4.
47. See KROVETZ & ARRIAZA, supra note 14, at 25.
48. See JERRY WARTGOW, WHY SCHOOL REFORM IS FAILING AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO
ABOUT IT 18-19 (2008).
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a conception of “teacher leadership” grossly trivializes the nature of PLC
work, while simultaneously diverting teachers’ energies away from their
students’ learning49 and (ironically) reintroducing the kind of unnecessary and
unproductive stressors that teachers have historically looked to unions to
remedy.50
Thus, for PLC models of teacher-driven school improvement to “make
good” on the promise to dramatically impact student learning for the better,
they must be cultivated with great care.
III. Teacher Leadership and Teacher Evaluation in Oklahoma: Are the Two
Compatible?
Given the tremendous potential for transforming schools through PLCs, and
assuming that some number of Oklahoma school districts could lay the
necessary groundwork for continuous, teacher-led school improvement, it
would be entirely reasonable for those schools to consider incorporating into
their evaluation instruments an expectation that all teachers participate in the
improvement process. This raises the question, does the state’s statutory and
regulatory framework for teacher evaluations permit incorporation of such an
expectation? If so, to what extent? For example, could a tenured teacher’s
refusal to engage in this kind of ongoing professional development provide
sufficient cause for termination of that teacher’s contract?
An analysis of these questions requires examination of the interplay
between the legal requirements for teacher evaluation and the legal
requirements for termination of tenured teachers’ contracts. This Part sets
forth the requirements for teacher evaluation in Oklahoma, exploring
specifically whether the relevant statute and corresponding regulations require
school districts to obtain the approval of their local teachers’ unions before
making PLC participation an element of teacher evaluations. Part IV then
analyzes whether a formalized expectation of PLC participation would be
legally enforceable for purposes of contract termination under the Teacher Due
Process Act of 1990.
At the outset, however, a caveat is in order. The need to deploy the
following analysis should be exceedingly rare. At least as far as actual
litigation is concerned, the analysis is only applicable to the extent that two
conditions obtain: (1) the school district relying on this analysis has managed
to establish the material conditions necessary to support PLC work; and (2)
despite the district’s good-faith efforts, at least one tenured teacher has refused
to participate. The first condition, while certainly difficult to meet, is within
49. See Mathison & Freeman, supra note 35, at 50.
50. See DeMitchell & Cobb, supra note 38, at 3-5.
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the reach of many school districts. By contrast, the second condition appears
highly unlikely, at least where the first condition has, in fact, been met. Where
a school district has made genuine, substantive efforts to support PLCs—for
example, by securing training for a few teacher-leaders who will lead
subgroups, by rearranging schedules and allocating appropriate amounts of
time, and possibly even by securing stipend funding—the chances that a
teacher would flatly refuse to participate seem remote. The primary value of
this analysis thus lies not in its ready application to a small army of recalcitrant
teachers (if such teachers even exist). Rather, the analysis is valuable because
it exposes the stifling effect of one aspect of Oklahoma’s current tenure
regime—the trial de novo provision—on school districts’ efforts to undertake
transforming their schools into PLCs in the first place.51
A. Teacher Evaluation in Oklahoma: The Black-Letter Law
The centerpiece of teacher evaluation law in Oklahoma is section 6-101.10
of the School Code, which reads, in pertinent part:
Each board of education shall maintain and annually review,
following consultation with or involvement of representatives
selected by local teachers, a written policy of evaluation for all
teachers and administrators. In those school districts in which there
exists a professional negotiations agreement . . . , the procedure for
evaluating members of the negotiations unit and any standards of
performance and conduct proposed for adoption beyond those
established by the State Board of Education shall be negotiable
items. . . . Every policy so adopted shall:
1. Be based upon a set of minimum criteria developed by the
State Board of Education;
2. Be prescribed in writing at the time of adoption and at all
times when amendments thereto are adopted. The original policy
and all amendments to the policy shall be promptly made available
to all persons subject to the policy;
3. Provide that all evaluations be made in writing and that
evaluation documents and responses thereto be maintained in a
personnel file for each evaluated person.52
The statute goes on to specify how often teachers must be evaluated and by
whom.53 It also requires that all persons who conduct personnel evaluations
51. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
52. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10 (2001).
53. See id. § 6-101.10(4)-(6) (indicating that probationary teachers—those having
completed less than three years of satisfactory service in one school district, 70 OKLA. STAT.
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participate in evaluation training provided by the State Department of
Education and authorizes the State Board of Education to “monitor compliance
with the provisions of this section by local school districts.”54
Though these and other details of evaluation procedure may seem dry and
administrative, they reflect important due process concerns. For example, the
provision that all current evaluation criteria must be in writing comports with
the constitutional notion, implied in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, that people must have adequate notice of any expectations implicating
their property interests—in this context, a teacher’s job, the means of her
livelihood.55 Likewise, the additional provision that evaluations themselves,
once executed, must be in writing and accessible to the teachers to whom they
pertain56 also comports with the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of an
opportunity to respond to governmental actions taken on the basis of the stated
expectations.57 The general underlying rationale for these evaluation
procedures thus reflects unquestionably sound policy.
Some of the specific elements of the above-quoted evaluation statute,
however, present thorny interpretive problems. For example, what is meant
by “consultation with or involvement of representatives selected by local
teachers”?58 And, more important for the present analysis, what is the
difference, if any, between “standards of performance and conduct,” which can
be the subject of negotiation under certain circumstances, and the “minimum
criteria” on which all evaluation policies must be based?59
With respect to the first question, neither the evaluation statute itself nor the
definitions section of the set of statutes governing teacher contracts expressly
defines “consultation” or “involvement.”60 Nor does the corresponding portion
of the Oklahoma Administrative Code shed any additional light on these terms,
reiterating simply that every district’s evaluation policy “shall be developed
by the [local school] board in consultation with representative teachers and

§ 6-101.3(7) (2001 & Supp. 2009)—must be evaluated at least twice per school year, while
tenured teachers should only be evaluated once; in both cases, evaluations must be conducted
by “certified administrative personnel designated by the local school board”).
54. Id. § 6-101.10.
55. See LAWRENCE F. ROSSOW & JAMES O. TATE, THE LAW OF TEACHER EVALUATION 37,
66-68 (2d ed. 2003); see also Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (indicating
that a property interest in continued employment can arise under state law or under the express
or implied terms of a particular employment contract).
56. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.11.
57. See ROSSOW & TATE, supra note 55, at 37.
58. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10.
59. Id.
60. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.3 (2001 & Supp. 2009).
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administrators.”61 Thus, the precise degree of “consultation with or
involvement of” teachers that the statute requires remains somewhat
ambiguous. But clearly the statute envisions that adoption, revision, and
review of a school district’s evaluation policy will result from some level of
collaboration between teachers, administrators, and school-board members.
Moreover, this “consultation or involvement” requirement applies to all
districts, whether or not the teachers in those districts have formally organized
themselves for collective bargaining.62 The statute thus reflects a fundamental
policy judgment that accords with the principles animating PLC models of
school improvement: Sound evaluation policies, like any other school policies,
are not “hatched” by administrators and school-board members who then
unilaterally impose those policies on teachers. Rather, sound evaluation
policies develop out of a process that involves teachers’ voices, experience,
and expertise.63
What is less clear is what exactly unionized school districts must do to
ensure that their evaluation policies comport with the statute. For
nonunionized school districts, the evaluation statute merely requires that the
local school board (1) consult with teacher representatives in some way and (2)
observe the mandate of the minimum criteria clause—that is, adopt an
evaluation policy that is “based upon a set of minimum criteria developed by
the State Board of Education.”64 By contrast, the statute’s negotiability clause
creates a heightened expectation for unionized districts: “In those school
districts in which there exists a professional negotiations agreement . . . , the
procedure for evaluating members of the negotiations unit and any standards
of performance and conduct proposed for adoption beyond those established
by the State Board of Education shall be negotiable items.”65
This language raises a crucial question: What does this negotiability clause
actually render negotiable? The clause certainly contemplates the negotiation
of the procedural aspects of teacher evaluation in unionized school
districts—i.e., the specifics of how a district administers evaluations. But the
“standards of performance and conduct” phrase suggests that the content or
substance of teacher evaluations is subject to negotiation as well, at least
insofar as that content exceeds the “standards . . . established by the State
Board of Education.”66 But what are these “standards”? Are they the same as

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:1-5-7(d)(1) (2006).
See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10.
See supra text accompanying note 21.
70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10(1).
Id. § 6-101.10.
Id.
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the “minimum criteria developed by the State Board of Education”?67 If so,
does this phrase thereby imply that any additional evaluation criteria that
surpass the state-mandated minimums must meet with union approval in order
to take effect in a unionized school district?68 If not—that is, if “standards”
and “minimum criteria” are somehow distinct—then should a requirement of
PLC participation be characterized as a “standard” potentially subject to
negotiation, or as an addition to the “minimum criteria” subject to the
legitimate discretion of a local school board? Finally, if construed as a
“standard,” is there any way in which a requirement of PLC participation
would not be subject to negotiation?
B. “Minimum Criteria” and “Standards of Performance and Conduct” Are
Distinct Elements of Teacher Evaluation Law
A casual reader might easily equate the “standards of performance and
conduct” with the “minimum criteria” for teacher evaluations and therefore
conclude that any elements of a unionized school district’s evaluation
instrument exceeding those established by the State Board of Education are
subject to negotiation. But closer examination of the text, as well as the
legislative and regulatory histories of the two concepts, yields a more complex
analysis. The text of the evaluation statute itself,69 the historical development
of its constituent parts (especially in relation to the Teacher Due Process Act
of 1990),70 and its corresponding regulations71 together suggest that these two
67. Id. § 6-101.10(1).
68. A state attorney general opinion published shortly after the minimum criteria clause was
added to the evaluation statute in 1985 assumed that any evaluation criteria that exceeded statemandated minimums would be subject to negotiation. See 1986 OK AG 146, Op. Okla. Att’y
Gen. No. 86-146; see also infra text accompanying note 76. At the time the attorney general’s
office published this advisory opinion, however, the state legislature had not yet added the
“standards of performance and conduct” phrase, see infra text accompanying notes 77-80; nor
had the State Board of Education yet promulgated any minimum criteria, see infra text
accompanying note 90. Moreover, the minimum criteria that the State Board of Education
eventually did promulgate turned out to be substantive rather than procedural in nature. See
OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-3-4, reproduced in app. A hereto. This fact renders the
soundness of the assumption in the 1986 attorney general’s opinion doubtful at best, because
in 1986 the evaluation statute’s negotiability clause applied only to procedural aspects of
evaluations. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-102.2 (1981 & Supp. 1986). Thus, this attorney general’s
opinion should not be relied on for the proposition that additions to the minimum criteria are
mandatorily negotiable. For development of the idea that additions to the minimum criteria are
not subject to negotiation, see discussion infra Part III.C.1.
69. 70 Okla. Stat. § 6-101.10; see also infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
71. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:1-5-7 (2006); see also infra text accompanying notes
81-92.
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aspects of teacher evaluation law are distinct from one another. The upshot of
this construction of the statute is this: to the extent that any additional elements
of evaluations bear the hallmarks of “minimum criteria,” the evaluation statute
does not require school districts to formally negotiate those additional
elements before incorporating them into their teacher evaluations.
The first and most obvious bit of support for this construction appears on
the face of the evaluation statute itself. When outlining the requirements that
all evaluation policies must satisfy, the statute refers to “minimum criteria.”72
But when discussing the more limited context of collective bargaining, the
statute specifies “standards of performance and conduct [as] . . . negotiable
items.”73 Basic principles of statutory interpretation instruct that the use of
different terms in different parts of a statute creates a presumption that the
legislature intended the terms to carry different meanings.74 At a minimum,
then, the use of these two distinct terms in the evaluation statute provides a
beginning point for the conclusion that they are not synonymous.
The historical development of the evaluation statute provides a second basis
for this conclusion. When the original evaluation statute passed in 1977, it
deemed all procedural aspects of evaluations subject to negotiation in districts
with collective bargaining agreements.75 The legislature then added the
minimum criteria clause in 1985.76 The phrase “standards of performance and
conduct” was not added until 1990, when the legislature passed the landmark
education reform bill known as House Bill 1017.77 Not coincidentally, the
Teacher Due Process Act formed part of this same piece of legislation78 and
explicitly cross-referenced the evaluation statute using the very same
“standards” terminology that House Bill 1017 grafted onto the evaluation
statute.79 Importantly, however, despite the simultaneous amendment of the
72. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10(1).
73. Id. § 6-101.10.
74. 73 AM. JUR. 2D § Statutes 131 (2001).
75. See Act of June 17, 1977, ch. 262, § 2, Okla. Sess. Laws 957, 958 (codified at 70 OKLA.
STAT. § 6-102.2 (Supp. 1977)).
76. See Education Improvement Act of 1985, ch. 329, sec. 16, § 6-102.2, 1985 Okla. Sess.
Laws 1478, 1486.
77. See Act of Apr. 25, 1990, ch. 2, sec. 71, § 6-102.2, 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws (Supp.) 167,
218-19 (current version at 70 OKLA. STAT. 6-101.10).
78. See id. §§ 75-85, 1989 Okla Sess. Laws (Supp.) at 221-25 (codified at 70 OKLA. STAT.
§§ 6-101.20 to -101.30 (Supp. 1990)).
79. See id. § 76, 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws (Supp.) at 221 (current version at 70 OKLA. STAT.
§ 6-101.21 (2001)). Specifically, when indicating the benchmarks applicable to performancebased contract termination decisions, the Act pointed (and still points) exclusively to the
“standards adopted by the State Board of Education or the local board of education pursuant
to [the evaluation statute].” Id. (emphasis added); see also supra text accompanying notes 216,
237.
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evaluation statute and enactment of the Teacher Due Process Act, the
legislature left the evaluation statute’s minimum criteria clause untouched.80
This failure to amend the minimum criteria clause to bring it in line with the
newly introduced “standards” concept gives rise to the inference that the
legislature envisioned the two sets of guidelines as distinct from one another.
The State Board of Education certainly seems to have interpreted the two
concepts as distinct. The Board has promulgated both a set of “Minimum
Criteria for Effective Teaching Performance”81 (the Minimum Criteria) and a
separate set of “Standards of Performance and Conduct for Teachers”82 (the
Standards), and the two sets of guidelines differ markedly from one another.
On one hand, the Minimum Criteria provide, in relatively straightforward
(though hardly specific) terms, the minimum expectations for teachers with
respect to classroom management, delivery of instruction, and student
assessment—all the rather routine aspects of teachers’ day-to-day activities.83
On the other hand, the Standards represent an attempt to articulate, in much
loftier terms, the fundamental aims and obligations of the teaching
profession.84 For example, the purpose statement of the Standards affirms that
“[t]eachers are charged with the education of the youth of this State. In order
to perform effectively, teachers must demonstrate a belief in the worth and
dignity of each human being, recognizing the supreme importance of the
pursuit of truth, devotion to excellence, and the nurture of democratic
principles.”85 Similarly, under the heading “Commitment to the students,” the
Standards instruct as follows: “The teacher must strive to help each student
realize his or her potential as a worthy and effective member of society. The
teacher must work to stimulate the spirit of inquiry, the acquisition of
knowledge and understanding, and the thoughtful formulation of worthy
goals.”86 Finally, the Standards recite the exclusive statutory grounds upon
which school boards can terminate tenured teachers’ contracts.87
The striking differences between these two sets of guidelines, as
promulgated, point to the State Board of Education’s understanding that each
was intended to serve a different purpose from the other. The respective
regulatory histories of the Minimum Criteria and the Standards further confirm
80. See Act of Apr. 25, 1990, sec. 71, § 6-102.2, 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws (Supp.) at 219.
81. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-3-4 (2006), reproduced in app. A hereto.
82. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-29-1 to -5 (2006), reproduced in app. B hereto.
83. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-3-4.
84. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-29-1.
85. Id.
86. Id. § 210:20-29-3.
87. Id. § 210:20-29-5 (reproducing, in part, the Teacher Due Process Act’s dismissal
provision, 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.22 (2001 & Supp. 2009)).
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this conclusion. As mentioned above, the state legislature amended the
evaluation statute to call for the promulgation of minimum evaluation criteria
in 1985.88 Yet, despite the fact that the State Board of Education published an
initial Notice of Rulemaking Intent regarding those criteria in 1988,89 the
official Minimum Criteria were not published until 1994.90 The Minimum
Criteria seem to have taken the proverbial “backseat” to the Standards, which
the legislature mandated in 1990,91 and which the State Board of Education
successfully promulgated in 199392—well before the final publication of the
Minimum Criteria. These separate regulatory trajectories reflect the State
Board of Education’s understanding that the legislature intended the two sets
of guidelines to remain distinct from one another.
C. “By Any Other Name”: A PLC Participation Requirement Is Not Subject
to Negotiation, Regardless of Characterization
Based on the foregoing analysis, one would expect school districts to favor
characterizing a PLC participation requirement as an addition to the Minimum
Criteria, because this characterization would relieve school districts of the need
to negotiate such a provision.93 And, as discussed below, significant support
for this characterization exists.94 Interestingly, however, characterization as
an addition to the Minimum Criteria does not appear to constitute an
indispensable prerequisite to relief from the duty to negotiate. A plausible
argument can be made that a PLC participation requirement would not be
subject to negotiation even if it were characterized as a performance
standard.95 Thus, for purposes of determining that a PLC participation
requirement is not subject to negotiation, either characterization works.

88. See Education Improvement Act of 1985, ch. 329, sec. 16, § 6-102.2, 1985 Okla. Sess.
Laws 1478, 1486 (current version at 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10 (2001)); see also text
accompanying note 76.
89. Notice of Rulemaking Intent, 5 Okla. Reg. 672 (Feb. 25, 1988).
90. Permanent Final Adoption, 11 Okla. Reg. 3143 (May 20, 1994).
91. See Act of Apr. 25, 1990, ch. 2, § 76, 1989 Okla. Sess. Laws (Supp.) 167, 221 (codified
at 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.21 (Supp. 1990)).
92. Permanent Final Adoption, 10 Okla. Reg. 2709 (May 26, 1993). Incidentally, the State
Board of Education also amended its existing regulation on evaluation at the same time. See
Permanent Final Adoption, 10 Okla. Reg. 2695, 2698-700 (May 26, 1993). This amended
regulation uses the term “minimum criteria” no less than four times in one subsection, while
cross-referencing the newly minted Standards in an entirely separate subsection. See OKLA.
ADMIN. CODE § 210:1-5-7(b), (d) (2006).
93. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10.
94. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
95. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.
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1. Characterizing a PLC Participation Requirement as an Addition to the
Minimum Criteria
If characterized as an addition to the Minimum Criteria, a requirement that
teachers help to transform their schools into PLCs by participating in
collaborative improvement efforts would not be subject to negotiation.
Because the minimum criteria clause, by its own terms, applies to all school
districts,96 and because the clause is distinct from the more narrowly applicable
negotiability clause, as established above,97 it follows that a local school board
has discretion to determine the specific contours of its evaluation criteria.98
A local teachers’ union, however, might object to this conclusion on the
grounds that the provision for negotiation of both the procedural and the
substantive aspects of evaluations in unionized districts99 creates an implied
duty of negotiation with respect to anything pertaining to the evaluation
instruments used in those districts. In other words, the union might argue that
because the “spirit” of the standards amendment to the negotiability clause100
was to render the substance of evaluations negotiable (like evaluation
procedure101), the minimum criteria clause effectively establishes an upper
limit on the criteria unionized school districts may use to evaluate their
teachers, absent negotiation.
Three observations speak to this argument. First, if the legislature had
intended to create a duty to negotiate additions to the Minimum Criteria, it
could have easily done so explicitly by adding “minimum criteria” to the
negotiability clause; the fact that the legislature did not do so supplies strong
evidence that it did not intend for the Minimum Criteria to be negotiable at
all.102 Second, the plain meaning of the word “minimum” implies that more
stringent criteria are permissible.103 Third, the fact that the clause merely
96. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10(1).
97. See discussion supra Part III.B.
98. Recall that the evaluation statute requires that every district’s evaluation policy “[b]e
based upon a set of minimum criteria developed by the State Board of Education.” 70 OKLA.
STAT. § 6-101.10(1).
99. See id. § 6-101.10; see also supra text accompanying note 65.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 66, 77.
101. See Act of June 17, 1977, ch. 262, § 2, 1977 Okla. Sess. Laws 957, 958; see also supra
text accompanying note 75.
102. See Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, ¶ 24, 19 P.3d 839, 845 (discussing the principle
of statutory interpretation, “expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” which posits that “the mention
of one thing in a statute impliedly excludes another thing”).
103. See Welch v. Crow, 2009 OK 20, ¶ 10 206 P.3d 599, 603 (reciting the principle of
statutory interpretation that holds that “[t]he words of a statute will be given their plain and
ordinary meaning unless it is contrary to the purpose and intent of the statute when considered
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requires that evaluation policies “[b]e based upon” the State Board of
Education’s Minimum Criteria suggests that the legislature contemplated some
degree of variance from district to district.104 The language of the statute itself
thus supports the conclusion that local school boards enjoy some degree of
discretion with respect to the specific evaluation criteria that they implement,
limited only by the procedural requirement of “consultation or involvement”105
and the substantive imperative to satisfy the “minimum criteria established by
the State Board of Education.”106
The more pertinent question is thus whether a PLC participation
requirement can be characterized as an addition to the Minimum Criteria, as
opposed to some sort of performance standard. On this score, a PLC
participation requirement fares well. As mentioned above, the Minimum
Criteria simply list all of the basic activities that should compose any teacher’s
routine practice.107 The list is divided into two major subsections, “Practice”
and “Products.”108 The “Practice” subsection further breaks down into
“Teacher management indicators” and “Teacher instructional indicators.”109
“Teacher management indicators” include those practices that create the
background conditions for classroom learning—adequate preparation, clear
establishment of classroom routines and behavioral expectations, and the
overall cultivation of an “orderly climate conducive to learning.”110 The
“Teacher instructional indicators” are similarly unsurprising (though, like the
management indicators, they may be difficult to implement and maintain in
practice). These declare, among other things, that a satisfactory teacher
“[e]stablishes objectives,” “[i]nvolves all learners,” “[e]xplains directions,”
and “[p]rovides for independent practice.”111 Under the “Products” heading,
the Minimum Criteria call for various kinds of documentation, all reflective
of effective teaching: lesson plans, student files and assessments, and other
records of student achievement.112
A requirement of PLC participation merely extends the logic of these
Minimum Criteria beyond the confines of the individual teacher’s classroom
to the broader school environment. For example, a third category, such as
as a whole”).
104. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10(1).
105. See id. § 6-101.10.
106. Id. § 6-101.10(1).
107. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-3-4 (2006), reproduced in app. A hereto; see also
supra text accompanying note 83.
108. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-3-4.
109. Id. § 210:20-3-4(a).
110. Id. § 210:20-3-4(a)(1).
111. Id. § 210:20-3-4(a)(2).
112. See id. § 210:20-3-4(b).
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“Teacher collaboration indicators” or “Teacher professionalism indicators,”
inserted under the “Practice” heading would dovetail seamlessly with the
existing criteria. Such a category might specify that a teacher, as a member of
a professional educational team, identify specific challenges to student
learning, research methods of addressing those challenges, select and
implement intervention strategies, and evaluate the effectiveness of such
strategies over time. These kinds of additional criteria merely build upon and
reinforce the goals reflected in the existing Minimum Criteria. Characterizing
them as additions to the Minimum Criteria thus appears more than reasonable;
therefore, incorporation of such criteria into evaluation instruments seems well
within the discretion of local school districts after “consultation or
involvement” of their teachers. The heightened requirement for formal
negotiation in unionized school districts does not apply under this
characterization.
2. Characterizing a PLC Participation Requirement as a Performance
Standard
Perhaps surprisingly, the same conclusion may obtain even if a PLC
participation requirement is characterized as a performance standard. Recall
that the evaluation statute deems “any standards of performance and conduct
proposed for adoption beyond those established by the State Board of
Education . . . negotiable items.”113 Undoubtedly, this clause renders
negotiable any locally developed standard that exceeds those established by the
State Board of Education. But what about a standard that falls within the
scope of the existing performance Standards? Might a unionized school
district be able to implement such a standard without resorting to formal
negotiation first? If so, might a formal requirement for PLC participation fall
within the scope of the existing Standards? Several pieces of evidence suggest
that it could.
The strongest support for this argument lies at the heart of the Standards
themselves. As a whole, the Standards exhibit a strange mix of lofty rhetoric
and general proscriptions. “Principle I,” for example, entitled “Commitment
to the students,” sets a list of generalized, positive behaviors against a list of
specific prohibitions.114 On one hand, “[t]he teacher must strive to help each
student realize his or her potential as a worthy and effective member of
society . . . [by] work[ing] to stimulate the spirit of inquiry, the acquisition of

113. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10 (2001).
114. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-29-3 (2006), reproduced in app. B hereto.
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knowledge and understanding, and the thoughtful formulation of worthy
goals.”115 On the other hand,
[i]n fulfillment of the obligation to the student, the teacher:
(1) Shall not unreasonably restrain the student from independent
action in the pursuit of learning,
(2) Shall not unreasonably deny the student access to varying
point of view,
(3) Shall not deliberately suppress or distort subject matter
relevant to the student’s progress.116
The regulation continues by specifying five more prohibitions related to the
quality of teachers’ interactions with students.117
The second principle of the Standards, entitled “Commitment to the
profession,” reads similarly.118 Following an opening declaration that “[t]he
teaching profession is vested by the public with a trust and responsibility
requiring the highest ideals of professional service,”119 the regulation sketches
an admirable ideal of the professional educator:
In order to assure that the quality of the services of the teaching
profession meets the expectations of the State and its citizens, the
teacher shall exert every effort to raise professional standards,
fulfill professional responsibilities with honor and integrity,
promote a climate that encourages the exercise of professional
judgment, achieve conditions which attract persons worthy of the
trust to careers in education, and assist in preventing the practice of
the profession by unqualified persons.120
The regulation then itemizes another set of prohibitions, aimed chiefly at
various forms of misrepresentation.121
The generally expansive rhetoric of these prescriptive portions of the
Standards suggests that a formal expectation that teachers participate in
continuous PLC school improvement efforts lies well within the scope of the
existing Standards. Teachers participating in PLCs accomplish the very goals
set forth in these principles through “exert[ion of] every effort to raise
professional standards, . . . promot[ion of] a climate that encourages the
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. § 210:20-29-3(a).
Id. § 210:20-29-3(b)(1)-(3).
See id. § 210:20-29-3(b)(4)-(8).
See id. § 210:20-29-4.
Id. § 210:20-29-4(a).
Id. § 210:20-29-4(b).
See id. § 210:20-29-4(c).
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exercise of professional judgment, [and] achieve[ment of] conditions which
attract persons worthy of the trust to careers in education”122—all in the service
of “help[ing] each student realize his or her potential as a worthy and effective
member of society.”123 Because PLC models of professional development and
school improvement reflect the very principles of professionalism demanded
by the Standards themselves, a formal expectation that teachers participate in
the process of transforming their schools into PLCs does not go “beyond”
those Standards and thus does not trigger the duty to negotiate.
Of course, this argument raises the issue of what role judges play in
determining whether particular evaluation criteria are, in fact, legally
enforceable. The following Part addresses this issue by first examining the
likely treatment that a PLC participation requirement would receive under the
current Teacher Due Process Act. This Part also proposes modifications to the
Act that would better support school districts’ efforts to improve their schools
through PLC development.
IV. Diminishing Returns on Teacher Protection: How the Trial De Novo
Overextends Teacher Tenure
Under the Teacher Due Process Act of 1990,124 a tenured teacher may
challenge the termination of his contract in a trial de novo in state district court
in the county where the employing school district is located.125 This provision
eliminates any kind of deference to the decisions of local professional
educators and elected school boards and therefore marks a significant
departure from the deferential judicial posture taken in a majority of states
when it comes to this issue.126 Also, by investing judges with the power to
determine the legitimacy of the criteria by which teachers’ performance is
evaluated, the trial de novo provision undermines the concerted efforts of
teachers themselves to articulate and implement rigorous professional
expectations tailored to the needs of their students and their communities.
Finally, in light of the litany of other protections for tenured teachers built into
the Teacher Due Process Act, the trial de novo provision represents a
superfluous level of teacher protection that places an undue burden on school
districts seeking to improve the quality of instruction in their schools.
Accordingly, the state legislature should repeal the provision and replace it
with a procedure involving a more deferential standard of review.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. § 210:20-29-4(b).
Id. § 210:20-29-3(a).
70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101.20 to -101.30 (2001).
Id. § 1-101.27(A).
See app. C hereto.
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A more detailed exploration of these claims requires an introduction to the
Teacher Due Process Act as a whole. Before turning to the Act itself,
however, it is important to locate the Act within the broader context of teacher
due process law, much of which centers around teacher tenure.127 Because
Oklahoma’s Teacher Due Process Act represents just one particular iteration
of tenure law, understanding the Act requires an initial overview of tenure law
generally, from which comparisons and contrasts can be drawn. The following
subsection thus briefly sketches the purposes, mechanisms, criticisms, and
defenses of tenure for teachers in America’s public schools.
A. Tenure for Public Schoolteachers: An Overview of Common Themes
The principal aim of the Teacher Due Process Act is to delineate the
contours of tenure for public K–12 teachers in Oklahoma.128 The Act shares
many of the basic purposes and features of tenure laws across the country.129
In the context of public education, the term “tenure” generically refers to the
set of statutorily conferred protections130 that a given state deems necessary to
shield qualifying teachers (typically teachers who have taught at least three
years in a single school district131) “from unlawful, arbitrary, and capricious
[school] board actions.”132 The United States Supreme Court has recognized
that these protections invest a tenured teacher with a “legitimate claim of
entitlement” to continued employment133—that is, employment beyond the
duration of a given contract134—which constitutes a property interest within
the protective purview of the Fourteenth Amendment.135
But historically, despite contemporary criticisms of tenure suggesting
otherwise,136 the protections of tenure were not intended to confer any special
privileges on individual teachers, nor were they intended primarily to benefit

127. See STEPHEN B. THOMAS ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW: TEACHERS’ AND STUDENTS’
RIGHTS 285, 395 (6th ed. 2009).
128. See 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101.20 to -101.30.
129. Compare id. with THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, 285-87, 405-24.
130. Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 (1972) (observing that under the
common law of contracts, the practices of an educational employer can impliedly create
enforceable tenure rights).
131. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 286.
132. RICHARD S. VACCA & WILLIAM C. BOSHER, JR., LAW AND EDUCATION:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES AND COURT DECISIONS 125 (7th ed. 2008).
133. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
134. See id. at 578.
135. See id. at 576-77.
136. See, e.g., Small Newspaper Group, The Hidden Costs of Tenure, http://thehiddencosts
oftenure.com/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2010) [hereinafter Hidden Costs of Tenure].
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teachers as a class.137 Rather, tenure developed primarily as a means of
safeguarding the public’s interest in a stable, permanent, and qualified teaching
force.138 The Minnesota Supreme Court traced the origin of tenure in this
country as far back as 1885, when leaders of the National Education
Association proposed a system analogous to the system of protections for civil
servants embodied in the first federal civil service act, passed in 1883.139 The
Minnesota court observed that the first civil service act’s purpose was to
remedy the destabilizing effects of the “spoils system,” whereby presidential
administrations ousted government employees and replaced them with their
own political supporters (many of whom were considerably underqualified for
the positions they assumed).140 Likewise, tenure laws developed to curb such
abuses within the country’s growing network of public schools.141 “It was
thought,” the court explained, “that for the good of the schools and the general
public the profession should be made independent of personal or political
influence, and made free from the malignant power of spoils and patronage.”142
Thus, at least at its inception, the notion of protecting teachers through tenure
was predicated on the idea that such protections would ultimately inure to the
benefit of society generally.
Today, most state tenure laws secure these protections—and theoretically
their intended societal benefits—through two complementary types of
provisions, one more substantive in nature, the other more procedural.
Substantively, most tenure statutes enumerate specific grounds for termination
of tenured teachers’ contracts,143 or at the very least require school boards to
show “good and sufficient” or “good and just” cause for such terminations.144
These substantive provisions effectively cabin the scope of a school district’s
power to terminate tenured teachers’ employment, conditioning termination
on a school district’s documentation and affirmative demonstration that a
teacher’s behavior or performance rises to the level of one of these causes.145
Tenure statutes also confer procedural protections by “provid[ing] orderly
procedures . . . to be followed if and when cause for a teacher’s dismissal is
established.”146 While these procedures vary from state to state and may be
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See McSherry v. City of St. Paul, 277 N.W. 541, 544, 546 (Minn. 1938).
See id. at 544.
Id. at 543.
See id.
See id.
Id.
LOUIS FISCHER ET AL., TEACHERS AND THE LAW 35 (7th ed. 2007).
VACCA & BOSHER, supra note 132, at 128 n.105.
See id.
Id. at 125.
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supplemented by local school board policies and collective bargaining
agreements,147 they must at a minimum satisfy baseline constitutional
requirements for due process.148 But because nontenured teachers are
constitutionally entitled to the same minimal level of due process, at least
during the terms of their contracts,149 tenure statutes typically require
heightened procedural safeguards for tenured teachers. Missouri’s tenure
statute, for example, grants tenured teachers the right to appeal an adverse
termination decision on the merits, while limiting nontenured teachers to
appeals based solely on procedural infractions or violations of constitutional
rights.150 Typically, courts enforce such statutory procedural protections—as
well as any other protections generated by local school board policies or
collective bargaining agreements—very strictly.151
The immediately observable effect of tenure, then, is that teachers who have
attained the status enjoy a greater degree of job security than teachers who
have not.152 But as mentioned previously, courts have viewed the benefits of
147. See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 395, 404.
148. See id. at 404; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (articulating the
definitive three-part test for determining whether, in the context of the deprivation of an
individual’s property or liberty interest, a given set of procedures satisfies the constitutional
requirement for procedural due process). The Mathews test balances (1) the private interest
implicated by official action; (2) the “risk of an erroneous deprivation” posed by the use of the
challenged procedures (taking account of the “probable value . . . of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards”); and (3) the governmental interest furthered by the use of the
challenged procedures. Id. Although the Mathews test recognizes the highly “flexible” nature
of due process, id. at 334, and therefore does not prescribe a specific menu of procedures, see
FISCHER ET AL., supra note 143, at 32, and THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 405, for two
comparable lists of the procedures that courts have deemed essential in the school-employment
context under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
149. See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 395.
150. Compare Teacher Tenure Act, MO. ANN. STAT. § 168.120 (West 2000) (tenured teacher
appeals), with id. § 168.126 (West Supp. 2010) (probationary teacher appeals).
151. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 405.
152. Tenure does not, however, “convey the right to teach in a particular school, grade, or
subject area. Teachers may be reassigned to [other] positions for which they are certified,”
regardless of their tenure status. THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 286-87. There are two
generally recognized limitations on school districts’ power to reassign teachers. The first is that
a school district must make reassignment decisions in good faith—that is, not as part of a veiled
attempt to induce the teacher to voluntarily resign or as a ruse to cover retaliation against the
teacher for the exercise of her legal rights. See id. at 281. “[T]he legal presumption,” however,
“is that boards of education act in good faith when making personnel decisions.” VACCA &
BOSHER, supra note 132, at 122. Therefore, the burden is usually on the teacher to demonstrate
that a school board acted in bad faith in a particular instance. This good-faith requirement thus
constitutes a rather weak limitation, in light of the evidentiary challenges associated with
proving that a school board acted in bad faith. The second limitation is somewhat stronger
because it is more objective: teacher transfers must not constitute demotions. See THOMAS ET
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tenure to accrue not only to individual teachers but also—and primarily—to
the public at large.153 Courts have linked the heightened job security
associated with tenure to broader public interests in “the integrity and freedom
of the educational process” and the achievement of a stable and permanent
teaching force, insofar as these tend to foster better educational opportunities
for students.154 Undoubtedly, tenure has its critics, who insist that the system
actually jeopardizes the learning of many students by rendering the process of
firing a deficient teacher so cumbersome and costly that school officials simply
avoid the process in all but the most egregious cases of teacher misconduct.155
These critics frequently condemn the use of teacher longevity as a proxy for
teacher quality, citing union-negotiated salary schedules keyed to time served
rather than results produced.156 In light of such criticisms, some states have
abolished tenure for public schoolteachers altogether, replacing that system of
protection with extended-term contracts, which usually range in duration from
three to five years and entitle teachers to the protections associated with
traditional tenure during the terms of those contracts.157
But at least two considerations counsel against jettisoning teacher tenure
altogether. First is the lack of any credible, long-term, empirical research
linking measurably higher student performance to the abolition of tenure
(assuming that a scientifically sound mechanism for comparing student
performance in tenure and nontenure states could even be generated). Second,
the difficulties associated with firing tenured teachers appear to stem at least
AL., supra note 127, at 281-82. In other words, the position to which a school district reassigns
a teacher must be “coequal” in responsibility and salary. See VACCA & BOSHER, supra note
132, at 129.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
154. 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 334 (2008).
155. See, e.g., Hidden Costs of Tenure, supra note 136 (providing a series of articles on the
costs of firing teachers in Illinois).
156. See, e.g., Scott Reeder, ‘Diplomacy’ Undermines Teacher Evaluations, in Hidden Costs
of Tenure, supra note 136.
157. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.33 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (providing for term
contracts of up to four years in duration, but preserving tenure—or “continuing contracts”—for
teachers who qualified for tenure before July 1, 1984); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 21.002,
21.106, 21.154 (Vernon 2006) (granting school districts authority to choose between term or
continuing contracts for teachers who successfully complete the probationary period, but also
authorizing school districts to return teachers serving on continuing contracts to probationary
status as an alternative to contract termination). In a similar vein, the controversial young
chancellor of public schools for the District of Columbia, Michelle Rhee, has proposed granting
six-figure salaries to teachers who voluntarily relinquish their tenured status. See Sean J. Miller,
Rheemaking Education, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 27, 2009, at 20-20, available at http://
features.csmonitor.com/backstory/2009/01/27/is-michelle-rhee-the-new-face-of-educationreform/#.
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as much from administrators’ incapacity or unwillingness to document teacher
ineffectiveness through evaluations as from tenure itself.158 This suggests that
development of and training in more rigorous evaluation systems may prove
more effective than abolishing tenure, especially where administrators who
conduct evaluations judiciously utilize such systems to document reasons for
declining contract renewal for teachers before they even reach tenured
status.159 Of course, in view of the considerable challenges that new teachers
inevitably face, probationary periods may need to be extended and mentoring
programs intensified, in order to ensure that new teachers actually receive the
time and support they need to hone their skills as competent educators.160 But
assuming (1) the development and deployment of better evaluation systems for
all teachers and (2) the provision of adequate time and support for new
teachers, tenure can continue to serve the broad public interests for which it
was originally developed without shielding ineffective teachers from contract
termination.
In fact, given the multiple and often conflicting pressures exerted on public
schools today, the public benefits of tenure may be more palpable than ever
before. In today’s economic climate, for example, tenure prevents cashstrapped school districts from firing experienced teachers as a cost-cutting
measure, only to replace them with young, cheap, inexperienced teachers.161
Similarly, in today’s increasingly polarized political and cultural climate,
tenure preserves the academic freedom of teachers—especially science
teachers—who choose not to toe whatever ideological lines their school boards
happen to have drawn.162 Finally, in today’s “accountability” climate, tenure
158. See CAMERON, supra note 40, at 174-75; see also Reeder, supra note 156.
159. See PATRICK MCGUINN, CTR. FOR AM. P ROGRESS, RINGING THE BELL FOR K-12
TEACHER TENURE REFORM 5-6 (2010), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/
2010/02/pdf/teacher_tenure.pdf.
160. Incidentally, PLCs by their very nature provide much of the training and support that
new teachers need to grapple with the additional challenges they face. See discussion supra Part
II. PLCs should not, however, be used as total substitutes for new teacher mentoring programs,
which should undergo improvement in their own right.
161. See Wanda Marie Thibodeaux, Pro & Cons of Teacher Tenure, EHOW.COM, http://
www.ehow.com/about_5121566_pro-cons-teacher-tenure.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
Statutory reduction-in-force (RIF) provisions sometimes allow school districts greater flexibility
in terminating tenured teachers’ employment “for reasons related to declining enrollment,
financial exigency, and school district consolidation.” THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 424.
Even in these situations, however, tenured teachers often take priority over nontenured teachers.
See, e.g., Babb v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-5, 1992 OK 46, ¶ 8, 829 P.2d 973, 976 (holding that
Oklahoma tenure law grants “[t]enured faculty . . . a claim to a preferential status over
nontenured faculty in implementation of a reduction-in-force plan”).
162. See M.J. Stephey, A Brief History of Tenure, TIME.COM, Nov. 17, 2008, http://www.
time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1859505,00.html.
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protects teachers’ ability—and to some extent sustains their incentive—to
experiment with new and creative lessons and methods and therefore to resist
the pressure to reduce their modes of teaching to correspond to the limited
range of thought processes reflected in standardized tests.163 Under these kinds
of economic, cultural, and political conditions, tenure helps to assure the
continued employment of educators who diligently apply their experience,
integrity, and innovation to help students acquire the skills and knowledge
they need to engage in society as active and productive citizens.
B. Tenure, Oklahoma-Style: The Teacher Due Process Act of 1990
Because the Teacher Due Process Act substantially preserves the system of
tenure that existed in the state before its enactment164—though with some
163. See Grant & Hill, supra note 26, at 20. With respect to standardized tests, it is
important to distinguish two things: (1) students’ understanding of the academic content
presented on standardized tests; and (2) the methods by which students (a) come to learn that
content and (b) convey their understanding of that content. This comment presumes the value
of the substantive knowledge that standardized tests attempt to measure: drawing logical
inferences from facts or data, correctly solving mathematical equations, applying the basic rules
of grammar, and so on. This comment does not presume, however, that the means by which
standardized tests purport to measure such knowledge necessarily correspond to the wide
variety of mechanisms—often called “learning styles”—by which individual students actually
learn. See HOWARD GARDNER, THE UNSCHOOLED MIND: HOW CHILDREN THINK AND HOW
SCHOOLS SHOULD TEACH 196 (10th anniv. ed. 2004). Certainly, once a student has found her
unique “route” into particular subject matter, with the help of a competent teacher, she can be
shown ways of reflecting her acquired understanding through the limited modes of presentation
available on most standardized tests (primarily multiple choice questions). Cf. RAVITCH, supra
note 25, at 159-60 (emphasizing that many schools “game” the standardized testing system by
replacing substantive subject-matter curriculum with test preparation programs). If teachers
only teach in those limited modes, however, some students may never acquire the requisite
knowledge in the first place. See id.; see also KOHN, supra note 25, at 29-31. Teachers must
therefore have the freedom to experiment with alternative methods of engaging students with
subject matter. See Grant & Hill, supra note 26, at 36-37. Tenure provides some of this
freedom for teachers who naturally, or because of their professional training, recognize the need
to explore such alternative methods to meet their students’ individual learning needs. See P.
Taylor Webb, The Stress of Accountability: Teachers as Policy Brokers in a Poverty School,
in TEACHER STRESS, supra note 26, at 1, 9-14. And for teachers who might not otherwise
explore alternative teaching methods, evaluation systems that require teachers to demonstrate,
document, and reflect upon their efforts to employ a variety of methods would likely incentivize
improvement in the quality of their instruction. Incidentally, PLCs provide formal channels
through which teachers can research, implement, and evaluate their own success with a virtually
infinite range of teaching techniques. See discussion supra Part II.
164. Compare 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101 to -103.15 (1981 & Supp. 1989), and Short v.
Kiamichi Area Vocational-Technical Sch. Dist., 1988 OK 89, ¶ 9, 761 P.2d 472, 475, with 70
OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101.20 to -101.30 (Supp. 1990), and House v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-29,
1997 OK 35, ¶ 7, 939 P.2d 1127, 1129.
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significant modifications, as discussed below165—the Act reaffirms the
underlying policy of protecting teachers as a means of protecting the public’s
interest in quality education for the state’s youth. While the Act also secures
certain procedural protections for nontenured, or “probationary,” teachers
during the terms of their contracts,166 its fundamental function, like that of
tenure laws throughout the country, is to establish the particular set of
protections that the state legislature has deemed necessary to shield tenured
teachers from “political, partisan or capricious” school board actions that
adversely impact teachers’ livelihoods and jeopardize students’ access to good
teachers.167
Under the Act, teachers who complete “three (3) or more consecutive
complete school years in [a teaching] capacity in one school district under a
written teaching contract” achieve the status of “career” (i.e., tenured)
teachers.168 For these teachers, the Act erects four distinct but interrelated
barriers to contract termination for performance-related reasons:169 (1) the
assignment of the evidentiary burden to the school district seeking
termination,170 (2) the requirement that a tenured teacher receive a reasonable
opportunity and assistance to remediate his performance,171 (3) a set of detailed
procedures regarding notice and the opportunity for a pretermination
hearing,172 and (4) the opportunity to appeal an adverse termination decision
in a trial de novo.173 The first three of these barriers represent fairly standard
features of tenure law in other states.174 For that matter, provisions for some
kind of appeal are common, if not virtually universal.175
Where Oklahoma departs from the norm of tenure law is in the particular
type of appeal to which tenured teachers are entitled under the Teacher Due
Process Act of 1990. Unlike courts in a majority of other states, which
165. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
166. See 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101.22(B), 6-101.24(A)-(C), 6-101.26(A), (D)-(E) (2001 &
Supp. 2009). Recall that a probationary teacher is one who has taught less than three
consecutive school years in one district. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.3(7) (2001 & Supp. 2009).
167. See VACCA & BOSHER, supra note 132, at 125 n.81 (quoting Birk v. Bd. of Educ., 457
N.E.2d 1065, 1067 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)); see also supra text accompanying notes 137-42.
168. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.3(4); see also supra note 13.
169. When non-performance-related incidents or problems give rise to termination decisions,
tenured teachers are not guaranteed the remediation period discussed below. See 70 OKLA.
STAT. § 6-101.24(D); see also infra text accompanying notes 186-93.
170. 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101.26(C), 6-101.27(D).
171. Id. § 6-101.24.
172. See id. § 6-101.26(A)-(C).
173. Id. § 6-101.27.
174. See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 405-13.
175. See id. at 405; see also app. C hereto.
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routinely defer to the employment decisions of local school boards in the
absence of strong evidence of error or impropriety,176 Oklahoma’s statutory
trial de novo requirement relieves a trial court of any obligation to show
deference to a school board’s decision, allowing the judge to conduct the trial
“as if [the question of termination] ha[d] never been resolved.”177 As
demonstrated in greater detail below, this provision for de novo review of
contract termination decisions undermines the ability of school boards to
formally hold tenured teachers to high expectations of professional
performance.178 In so doing, the provision lends credence to the arguments
forwarded by the critics of tenure, who contend that tenure laws all too often
serve to protect weak and ineffectual teachers rather than foster the
employment security that good teachers need to flourish.179 In view of the
array of other protections available to tenured teachers under the Teacher Due
Process Act, this provision thus creates a needless obstruction to school
improvement efforts, supplying little more than extra fodder for criticism by
those who misguidedly advocate the abolition of tenure as a prerequisite to
long-term, systematic school improvement.
A closer look at Oklahoma’s more typical tenure provisions demonstrates
the sufficiency of tenure without the trial de novo provision. First, Oklahoma
follows the practice of most states by enumerating—and thereby
restricting—the grounds on which the contracts of tenured teachers may be
terminated.180 A probationary teacher may be dismissed or not reemployed
simply for some cause articulated in writing by the teacher’s supervising
administrator and endorsed by the school board.181 By contrast, a school
district may only terminate the contract of a tenured teacher on the basis of one
or more of the eight grounds listed in the Teacher Due Process Act
itself182—some of which directly pertain to a teacher’s professional
performance,183 others of which pertain more to a teacher’s character and
176. For an overview of the judicial review standards observed tenured teacher contract
termination cases nationwide, see app. C hereto.
177. Hagen v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No I-004, 2007 OK 19, ¶ 5, 157 P.3d 738, 739.
178. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 155-56.
180. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.22 (2001); see also FISCHER ET AL., supra note 143, at 31,
35.
181. See 70 OKLA. STAT. §§ 6-101.22(B), 6-101.25 to -101.26.
182. Id. § 6-101.22(A).
183. The performance-related grounds are willful neglect of duty, repeated negligence in
performance of duty, incompetency, instructional ineffectiveness, and unsatisfactory teaching
performance. Id. § 6-101.22(A)(1)-(2), (4)-(6); see also id. § 6-101.24(D) (identifying these as
“cause[s] related to inadequate teaching performance,” for which a teacher must be afforded an
opportunity for remediation).
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fitness for the responsibility of caring for the community’s children.184 The
statute thus places squarely on the shoulders of the school district the burden
of documenting and, when necessary, proving to a court that the teacher’s
performance or conduct falls within the scope of at least one of these
grounds.185 This appropriation of the evidentiary burden marks the first major
check on a school district’s power to terminate tenured teachers’ contracts.
Conversely, then, it also provides tenured teachers their first major line of
defense in any termination action.
The second check on a school district’s power of contract termination, at
least with respect to the performance-related grounds, is the Teacher Due
Process Act’s admonishment and remediation provision.186 A school district
may not simply adduce evidence that a teacher’s performance meets one of
these grounds and summarily terminate her contract.187 Before administrators
can even recommend termination, the admonishment and remediation
provision requires them to provide poorly performing teachers, whether
tenured or not, with both the opportunity to improve and the assistance they
need to do so.188 The relevant part of the statute reads as follows:
When an administrator who has the responsibility of evaluating a
teacher identifies poor performance or conduct that the
administrator believes may lead to a recommendation for the
teacher’s dismissal or nonreemployment, the administrator shall:
1. Admonish the teacher, in writing, and make a reasonable
effort to assist the teacher in correcting the poor performance or
conduct; and
2. Establish a reasonable time for improvement, not to exceed
two (2) months, taking into consideration the nature and gravity of
the teacher’s performance or conduct.189
The State Board of Education’s corresponding regulations spell out specific
examples of the kinds of assistance administrators and school districts should
provide to teachers in need of remediation.190 These include opportunities to
observe other teachers, additional planning requirements or opportunities,
184. The character- and fitness-related grounds are mental or physical abuse to a child and
commission of an act of moral turpitude. Id. § 6-101.22(A)(3), (7). The eighth ground for
termination, abandonment of contract, occupies a category of its own. See id. § 6-101.22(A)(8).
185. See id. § 6-101.22; see also id. §§ 6-101.25 to -101.27.
186. See id. § 6-101.24.
187. See id.
188. See id. § 6-101.24(A).
189. Id.
190. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:1-5-7(d)(12), (e) (2006).
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video taping and critique, access to a professional library, and supplemental
professional development activities.191 Moreover, the statute itself further
provides that performance-related grounds or causes “shall not be the basis for
a recommendation to dismiss or not reemploy [any] teacher unless and until
the provisions of this section have been complied with.”192
Of course, this second “check” on a school district’s power to terminate
tenured teachers’ contracts operates somewhat differently from the others,
because it increases the likelihood, at least theoretically, of reaching a
mutually beneficial outcome for both an underperforming teacher and her
employing school district. If the teacher improves, not only does she keep her
job, but the school also effectively gains a better teacher, assuming that the
teacher continues her progress. So this provision may be better conceptualized
as creating an affirmative obligation to assist struggling teachers, rather than
imposing a negative restriction on school districts’ authority to terminate such
teachers’ contracts.193 However characterized, the admonishment and
remediation provision constitutes an indispensable prerequisite to a school
board’s decision to terminate a teacher’s contract on performance-related
grounds, and thus represents the second crucial protection for teachers built
into tenure law in Oklahoma.
Only if a teacher “does not correct the poor performance . . . cited in the
admonition within the time specified” may an administrator initiate the process
that can ultimately culminate in the school board’s decision to terminate a
teacher’s contract.194 The collection of requirements that make up this process
represents the third key limitation on school boards’ power of contract
termination for tenured teachers. The process begins when a teacher’s
administrator recommends to the district superintendent that the teacher’s
contract should be terminated.195 The superintendent must then decide whether
191. See id.
192. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.24(D). This clause appears to create the kind of conditionprecedent requirement that the Oklahoma Supreme Court found lacking under the prior due
process regime. See Jackson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 1982 OK 74, ¶¶ 4-5, 648 P.2d 26, 29
(finding that the school district’s failure to provide a remediation period did not, under the
circumstances, violate the plaintiff-teacher’s procedural rights).
193. Indeed, the State Board of Education’s corresponding regulations cast admonishment
and remediation in precisely this affirmative light. Underscoring in particular the
administrator’s role in teacher remediation, the regulations link that role to the quality of
administrators’ own professional performance: “Principals having delegated administrative
responsibilities as a part of the comprehensive operation of their respective schools have an
inherent obligation for the professional success of their teaching staff.” OKLA. ADMIN. CODE
§ 210:1-5-7(e).
194. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.24(B).
195. Id.
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to accept that recommendation and, if so, must submit the recommendation in
writing to the local school board, specifying both the statutory grounds for the
recommendation and the facts that support those grounds.196 Upon receipt of
the recommendation, the school board must ensure that the teacher receives a
copy of the recommendation,197 along with notification of the teacher’s right
to a hearing before the board at a time the board schedules between twenty and
sixty days after the teacher’s receipt of the notice.198
Once she has received the notice and recommendation, the teacher may
decline to challenge the recommendation, but by doing so she forfeits any
opportunity to appeal on the basis of a denial of due process.199 If, on the other
hand, the teacher elects to exercise her right to a hearing to contest the
recommendation, the school board must consider any evidence or testimony
that the teacher or her designated representative presents, weighing such
evidence or testimony against that presented by the district superintendent,
who bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
teacher’s performance falls within one of the statutory grounds for contract
termination.200 Only after such consideration may the school board decide, by
vote in an open meeting, whether to terminate or renew the teacher’s
contract.201 The board must then notify the teacher of its decision.202
This cluster of procedural requirements, together with the enumerated
termination grounds and the admonition and remediation provision,
corresponds to provisions common to teacher tenure statutes around the
country.203 By contrast, the fourth mechanism by which the Teacher Due
Process Act seeks to protect teachers—the provision that a teacher may appeal
any adverse termination decision in a trial de novo204—places Oklahoma
among a minority of states in which courts or other reviewing tribunals show
no deference to the personnel decisions of local educational leaders, even
when those decisions are supported by substantial evidence or exhibit no
196. See id. § 6-101.25.
197. Id. § 6-101.26(A). The statute lists the precise means by which a teacher must be
notified: “[T]he board shall mail a copy of the recommendation to the teacher by certified mail,
restricted delivery, return receipt requested, by personal delivery to the teacher with a signed
acknowledgment of receipt, or by delivery by a process server.” Id.
198. Id.
199. See id. § 6-101.26(C); see also THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 404.
200. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.26(C). The hearing must also accommodate the exercise
of “all rights [to which a teacher is entitled] under the circumstances by the United States
Constitution and the Constitution of Oklahoma.” Id. § 6-101.26(A).
201. Id. § 6-101.26(C).
202. Id.
203. See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 404-24.
204. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.27(A).
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arbitrary or capricious quality.205 The following subsection explores the
implications of this unnecessarily stringent provision, concluding that it
disincentivizes school districts’ efforts to improve the quality of instruction
offered in their schools through the development of PLCs.
C. The Trial De Novo for Performance-Based Termination Decisions: An
Exercise in Undue Process
The problematic—and unusual206—aspect of the teacher tenure regime in
Oklahoma is the trial de novo provision, applicable in the event that a tenured
teacher challenges a school board’s decision to terminate his contract.207 The
trial de novo provision establishes that a trial court owes no degree of
deference to a local school board with respect to that school board’s contract
termination decision.208 In legal terms, this means that the applicable standard
of review, should a teacher appeal the school board’s decision to a district
court, is de novo.209 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has explained that under
the Teacher Due Process Act, “‘[d]e novo review’ in the trial court means that
there must be a complete examination of all issues, both of fact and law, and
the cause stands as if it has never been resolved.”210 This type of appeal
presents more than an additional procedural obstacle to performance-based
termination decisions. At least where a school board attempts to make its
205. See app. C hereto; see also VACCA & BOSHER, supra note 132, at 122. Ascribing a
precise number to the collection of states that show no deference to school board decisions is
somewhat difficult, as reflected in Appendix C hereto. Among the states in which school
boards themselves actually render termination decisions, the number hovers just over a dozen,
but this figure includes states in which courts appear to apply a de novo review standard (or its
functional equivalent) to legal questions, while observing greater deference with respect to
factual matters. This group comprises Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. See
app. C hereto. If one also includes states in which the statutory scheme delegates the authority
to render initial termination decisions to entities other than local school boards, then five more
states must be added to this list: California, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, and New York. See id.
Though this block of states appears to represent a substantial minority, what differentiates many
of these states’ statutory regimes from Oklahoma’s is that the initial decision-making or
reviewing entity is often a state educational agency or a hearing officer who has specialized
training or experience in educational law. See id. In these instances, the initial reviewing
tribunal is much more likely than a district judge to be attuned to the issues surrounding
educational reform and may be able to more readily ascertain when the failure to meet certain
evaluation criteria rises to the level of unsatisfactory performance.
206. See app. C hereto.
207. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.27(A).
208. See Hagen v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No I-004, 2007 OK 19, ¶ 3, 157 P.3d 738, 739.
209. See id.
210. Id. ¶ 5, 157 P.3d 738, 739.

562

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:527

termination decisions on the basis of documented deficiencies in a teacher’s
instructional performance,211 the provision appoints judges as the final arbiters
of what constitutes adequate teaching performance. The provision thus divests
school boards of the authority to establish rigorous performance expectations
and to render personnel decisions on the basis of those expectations.
Ultimately, then, the provision severely restricts a school district’s ability to
develop structures or systems for generating the kind of long-term, teacherdriven school improvement embodied in PLCs.
De novo review allows a court to show “no deference . . . to [a] School
Board’s findings of fact or conclusions of law,”212 no matter how reasonable
those findings or conclusions may have been. In the context of performancerelated termination decisions, the problem with this standard of review is not
so much that it forces school districts to carefully document the factual
underpinnings of a charge of unsatisfactory performance; indeed, school
districts would still be required to do so under more deferential standards such
as abuse of discretion213 or substantial evidence review.214 Rather, the problem
is that de novo review affords school districts no margin for determining for
themselves, within the reasonable bounds of the law, the means by which
teachers may be required to demonstrate conformity with the State Board of
Education’s Standards,215 which ultimately represent the only benchmarks for
“determining whether or not the professional performance of a teacher is
211. This comment makes no argument regarding whether a de novo review standard is
appropriate where a school district alleges non-performance-related grounds—i.e., mental or
physical abuse to a child or commission of an act of moral turpitude, see supra note 184—as
the basis for a termination decision. For insight into how the Oklahoma Supreme Court has
construed these grounds in the context of trials de novo, see Hagen, 2007 OK 19, 157 P.3d 738
(affirming the trial court’s finding that a school district failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that a special education teacher who had slapped a sixth-grade special education
student twice on the cheek had mentally or physically abused the child), and Ballard v. Indep.
Sch. Dist. No. 4, 2003 OK 76, 77 P.3d 1084 (holding that a teacher’s “unexecuted threat against
a school superintendent and another teacher, made on school grounds but outside the general
purview of the students, does not constitute moral turpitude under the law of the State of
Oklahoma”).
212. Weston v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 35, 2007 OK 61, ¶ 8, 170 P.3d 539, 542.
213. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Blytheville, Ark. Sch. Dist., No. 5, 746 S.W.2d 381, 383-84 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1988) (reciting the contents of an administrator’s letter to a teacher documenting
multiple incidents of insubordination, and holding that “[t]he determination not to renew a
teacher’s contract is a matter within the discretion of the school board, and the reviewing court
cannot substitute its opinion for that of the board in the absence of an abuse of that discretion”).
214. See, e.g., Leach v. Bd. of Educ., 295 A.2d 582, 585 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972) (holding that
substantial evidence supported a school board’s finding that a teacher had engaged in a pattern
of willful insubordination that warranted contract termination under Delaware law).
215. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 210:20-29-1 to -5 (2006), reproduced in app. B hereto.
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adequate” for purposes of continued employment.216 Ultimately, then, even if
a school district’s incorporation of a PLC participation requirement fully
complies with the procedures set forth in the evaluation statute,217 de novo
review grants judges the final authority to determine whether a teacher’s
failure to fulfill that requirement constitutes legal grounds for contract
termination. De novo review thus stymies a school district’s ability to work
with its teachers to develop and maintain robust professional expectations
tailored to the needs of its own students, because it deprives the district of the
ability to enforce such expectations.
The relationship between evaluations and termination decisions is the key
to understanding this unfortunate result. As a practical matter, evaluations
supply much of the factual basis for a school board’s decision to either retain
a tenured teacher or terminate his contract on performance-related grounds.218
But under a de novo standard of review, school boards lack the authority to
determine whether the criteria by which they evaluate teachers correspond to
the legal grounds on which a tenured teacher’s contract may be terminated for
performance-related reasons.219 De novo review displaces this authority,
relocating it within the exclusive discretion of state district judges.
Two hypothetical scenarios may help to illustrate the problems that arise
from this statutory regime. The first draws on the analysis in Part III.C.2
above to demonstrate the effect of de novo review if a school district contends
that its PLC participation requirement should be characterized as a
performance standard within the scope of the State Board of Education’s
existing Standards such that formal negotiation with respect to the requirement
is not necessary. The second demonstrates the effect of de novo review if a
school district either negotiates for a PLC participation requirement or
contends that the requirement should be characterized as an addition to the
Minimum Criteria under the analysis presented in Part III.C.1. Together, these
hypotheticals illustrate how a de novo review standard undermines efforts to
initiate and sustain long-term educational improvement through PLCs.
In the first hypothetical, a school district recognizes, through the prodding
of some of its most effective teachers, that helping its schools transform
themselves into professional learning communities holds tremendous potential
216. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.21(D) (2001); see also infra text accompanying note 237.
217. See discussion supra Part III.A.
218. See ROSSOW & TATE, supra note 55, at 19-20.
219. Recall that the statutory grounds for termination of tenured teachers’ contracts are
enumerated in section 6-101.22 of the Oklahoma School Code. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.22; see
also supra note 183 and accompanying text. Recall also that the State Board of Education’s
Standards incorporate these termination grounds. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-29-5; see
also supra text accompanying note 87.
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for facilitating and supporting long-term improvements in student learning.220
Accordingly, the district not only implements support mechanisms to allow
teachers to meaningfully engage in PLC work, but also incorporates into its
evaluation policy a generic requirement that all its teachers participate in PLC
work, even defining the minimum level of engagement that would satisfy the
requirement. Relying on the kind of analysis given in Part III.C.2, the district
believes that this particular requirement falls well within the scope of the State
Board of Education’s performance Standards.221 Therefore, although the
district consults with its teachers before incorporating the requirement, as the
evaluation statute requires for all evaluation policies,222 the district does not
submit the question of the requirement’s incorporation to the local teachers’
association for formal negotiation.
If a tenured teacher then refuses to participate in the kind of collaborative
and reflective work promoted by PLCs, and her subsequent evaluations reflect
this refusal, the question arises whether the school board has any legally
defensible grounds on which to terminate the teacher’s contract. Imagine, for
example, that the school district meticulously adheres to all the procedural
requirements of the Teacher Due Process Act223 and terminates the teacher’s
contract on grounds of “willful neglect of duty.”224 The school board’s theory,
as conveyed in its notice of termination,225 is that by not engaging in
systematic reflection on her own classroom practices and by not working
collaboratively with other teachers to research and develop better instructional
practices, the teacher is not exhibiting the kind of “[c]ommitment to the
profession” that the State Board’s Standards demand.226 The school board
cites the teacher’s repeated refusals, documented in the teacher’s evaluations,
as evidence that the teacher is not, for example, “exert[ing] every effort to raise
professional standards” or helping to “achieve conditions which attract persons
worthy of the trust to careers in education,” as expected under the Standards.227
The teacher then appeals this decision in a trial de novo, arguing that the
evaluation requirement for PLC participation is unenforceable because it
exceeds the State Board’s Standards and can therefore only be adopted through

220. See discussion supra Part II.
221. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
222. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10 (2001).
223. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
224. 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.22(A)(1).
225. See id. § 6-101.26(A).
226. See OKLA. ADMIN. CODE 210:20-29-4 (2006), reproduced in app. B hereto; see also
supra text accompanying notes 114-23.
227. OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 210:20-29-4(b).
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formal negotiation with the local teachers’ association.228 In short, the teacher
argues, the requirement was not adopted in accordance with the evaluation
statute and is thus effectively void. The question for the judge to resolve in
response to the teacher’s contention is whether the requirement falls inside or
outside the scope of the existing Standards. And while some judges may be
swayed by the argument that the Standards indeed encompass such a
requirement,229 other judges may not be similarly persuaded,230 and de novo
review, by definition, relieves these judges of the obligation to defer to the
reasonable assessment of the local school board.231 De novo review thus
creates considerable uncertainty with respect to the legal enforceability of this
kind of evaluation requirement. This uncertainty, in turn, can discourage
school districts from undertaking the difficult task of fostering PLCs in the
first place.
Moreover, even if the district judge in this hypothetical appeal finds the
school board’s legal theory compelling and affirms the board’s decision to
terminate the teacher’s contract, the school board still stands divested of much
of its authority to guide professional performance in its own district. The net
effect of de novo review, whether a district judge “buys” the school board’s
argument or not, is that it vests judges with the ultimate discretion to decide
what professional activities sufficiently demonstrate the ideals articulated in
the Standards. Conversely, then, de novo review strips such discretion from
the very school boards and professional educators ostensibly responsible for
ensuring that those ideals are realized in their own school districts.232 So while
the school board in this case may win the immediate legal argument, the fact
that a school district must obtain judicial approval to confirm the legitimacy
of a simple evaluation requirement undermines the school board’s authority,
as guardian of the public’s trust with respect to the education of children, to
meet the particular educational needs of students its own district. Furthermore,
state courts around the country routinely defer to these kinds of personnel
decisions by school boards, in recognition of this very authority.233 Even the
228. See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10 (2001).
229. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.
230. Conceivably, judges in this latter category might be reluctant to endorse the notion that
teachers’ professional “performance” should include more than direct instructional interactions
with students, absent some indication that the state legislature or the State Board of Education
has embraced this view. Thus, in the absence of an outright repeal of the trial de novo
provision, some legally binding indication from the state legislature or the State Board of
Education may be needed to assure judges that PLC requirements are legitimate and
enforceable.
231. See supra text accompanying note 212.
232. See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 127, at 393.
233. See app. C hereto.
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U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that “school authorities have the right and
the duty to screen the officials, teachers, and employees as to their fitness to
maintain the integrity of the schools as a part of ordered society.”234
A second hypothetical scenario further highlights the remarkable degree of
authority that the Teacher Due Process Act allocates to district judges. This
scenario could play out in either of two variations. The first is almost identical
to the previous hypothetical, except that instead of characterizing its PLC
participation requirement as a performance standard, the school district
successfully convinces a judge that the requirement represents an addition to
the Minimum Criteria and that it is therefore not subject to negotiation.235 The
second variation involves a school district that voluntarily submits a proposal
for incorporation of a PLC participation requirement to its local teachers’
association. A de novo review standard poses essentially the same problem
under either of these variants; this hypothetical uses the latter because it better
illustrates the reach that the trial de novo provision grants a judge into the
traditional province of school board authority.
Imagine that the local teachers’ association agrees to the school district’s
proposal to incorporate a PLC participation requirement into the district’s
evaluation instrument, perhaps as a pure expression of the association’s
genuine interest in transforming itself into a more professional organization,236
or perhaps in exchange for slightly higher salaries, additional personal days,
or some other legitimate benefit for the teachers of the district. As in the
previous hypothetical, a teacher subsequently refuses to engage in the expected
PLC work, the district terminates the teacher’s contract on the same theory of
willful neglect of duty, and the teacher appeals. This time, however, the
teacher cannot claim that the PLC requirement in the district’s negotiated
evaluation policy is void on procedural grounds. Instead, the teacher simply
argues that the requirement does not constitute any part of the law that the
district court, exercising its power of de novo review, must consider when
determining whether the evidence the school district has submitted legally
indicates willful neglect of duty.
To make this argument, the teacher relies primarily on one small and
somewhat enigmatic subsection of the Teacher Due Process Act: “In
determining whether or not the professional performance of a teacher is
adequate, the standards adopted by the State Board of Education shall be
234. Adler v. Bd. of Educ. 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952), abrogated in part by Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 595 (1967) (recognizing that school board decisions implicating
teachers’ constitutional rights merit no judicial deference, but not questioning the soundness of
deferring to school board authority with respect to other dismissal grounds).
235. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
236. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
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considered. Consideration may be given to any written standards of
performance which have been adopted by any other education-oriented
organization or agency.”237 Assuming that the school district concedes that the
contested evaluation requirement constitutes a performance standard exceeding
or supplementing the state Standards,238 the teacher’s argument might run thus:
The Teacher Due Process Act places only one absolute requirement on the
process of deciding whether a contract termination is warranted by
law—simply that the reviewing court consider the State Board of Education’s
Standards. The Act certainly permits the court, in the second sentence quoted
above, to consider any supplemental standards that the school board used to
reach its termination decision. But the permissive nature of this clause appears
to relieve a state district judge of any obligation to consider supplemental
standards when reviewing a particular school board’s decision to terminate a
tenured teacher’s contract on the basis of that teacher’s failure to meet the
standards incorporated into the district’s evaluation policy. Therefore, because
a judge may disregard any supplemental standards when conducting her
review, those standards cannot constitute any part of the law that a judge is
called on to interpret in the course of de novo review. In other words, the fact
that consideration of supplemental standards is merely permissive signals that
they do not carry the force of law and are ultimately nonbinding in any action
to terminate a tenured teacher’s contract.
This argument, if correct, places the judge in an interpretive bind. On one
hand, if she ignores the locally developed and negotiated standard, then she
effectively renders hollow the prospect that school districts can, in fact,
supplement the state Standards through good-faith negotiation, as suggested
by the evaluation statute.239 What good is a supplemental standard if it cannot
be enforced? On the other hand, if she feels compelled to enforce the
supplemental standard in order to avoid this result, then she effectively ignores
the statutory difference between the mandatory “shall” and the permissive
“may” in the Teacher Due Process Act provision quoted above.240 Moreover,
while the judge in this scenario might resort to one of several principles of
statutory interpretation to resolve the dilemma in one way, a different judge,
also armed with the power of de novo review and facing the same scenario,
might resolve the issue differently. So until an appeal reaches the Oklahoma
Supreme Court for final determination, school districts have no way of
knowing the legal status of a PLC participation requirement.

237.
238.
239.
240.

70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.21(D) (2001) (emphasis added).
See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.10 (2001).
See id.
See 70 OKLA. STAT. § 6-101.21(D); see also supra text accompanying note 237.
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By leaving consideration of locally developed and negotiated standards
purely to the discretion of district judges, de novo review deprives school
districts of any predictable means of determining if, when, and to what extent
these supplemental standards will ever receive consideration in the course of
a judge’s deliberations over whether to affirm or reverse a school board’s
contract termination decision. This unpredictability creates a strong
disincentive for districts to attempt to negotiate supplemental standards at all,
including any standard regarding PLC development and participation.
This comment thus urges the state legislature to amend the Teacher Due
Process Act to provide for a more deferential judicial stance toward the
contract termination decisions that school boards make on the basis of locally
developed standards of performance, whether those standards arise from some
method of teacher consultation or from formal negotiation with local teachers’
associations. A more deferential standard of review, such as abuse of
discretion, would require a court to defer to local school boards’ interpretations
of the Standards as long as the boards “made a reasonable choice (not
necessarily the best choice) within the bounds of the law.”241 Such deference
is typical in administrative law contexts, where the decision-making agency
not only carries the responsibility of administering a particular set of statutory
mandates but also brings its expertise to bear in doing so.242 Many
jurisdictions apply administrative agency law to school districts,243 and
Oklahoma should follow suit. Under an administrative review regime, the
discretion to decide what professional activities demonstrate a teacher’s
adherence to the high professional ideals set forth in the state Standards would
rest largely with school boards and the professional educators—teachers and
administrators alike—who help to inform school district policies. A more
deferential standard of review would bring Oklahoma in line with many other
241. John F. Reif, Standards of Review, 79 OKLA. B.J. 34, 35 (2008) (discussing the
differences between different standards of review, with special focus on how the standards
operate under Oklahoma law). Reif further describes abuse of discretion review as “requir[ing]
a reviewing court to sustain a decision unless it is so likely wrong that no reasonable person
would reach the same conclusion.” Id.
242. See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 491 (2004).
243. See, e.g., Lehto v. Bd. of Educ. 962 A.2d 222, 226 (“If there was presented substantial
and credible evidence to support the charges and a fair administrative hearing was had, the
Superior Court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the school authorities.”
(quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Shockley, 155 A.2d 323, 327-28 (Del. 1959))); Moe v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 696, 623 N.W.2d 899, 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (“The school board’s decision is not
reviewed de novo and will not be set aside unless the decision is fraudulent, arbitrary,
unreasonable, not supported by substantial evidence in the record, not within the school board’s
jurisdiction, or based on an erroneous theory of law.” (citing Ganyo v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
832, 311 N.W.2d 497, 500 (Minn. 1981))); see also app. C hereto.
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states that recognize the valuable and legitimate role that school boards must
play—indeed, the duty that school boards owe—to ensure that students receive
high-quality instruction from high-quality teachers.244 More important, a more
deferential standard of review would grant school districts the flexibility to
foster and sustain cultures of professionalism within their schools that can
support long-term school improvement measures that respond to the particular
educational needs of local communities.
V. Conclusion: The Limits and Possibilities of Teacher Evaluation as an
Instrument of Reform
There is no magic bullet that will transform American schools into effective
institutions of learning. Creating a system of education that truly leaves no
child behind will require the development of sound educational policy at all
levels—national, state, and local—and will demand the concerted efforts of
educators, parents, businesses, community organizations, legislators, and
institutions of higher learning. This type of “all of the above” educationalreform model reflects the urgency with which we must ensure that all children
have the knowledge, skills, character, and opportunity to become productive
democratic citizens.
Given both the enormity and complexity of this task, the legal structures
that frame educational practices in this country must empower rather than
ignore or handicap educators, especially teachers, in their efforts to meet the
needs of their students. As the professionals who interact most closely with
the very students whom the educational system is supposed to serve, teachers
themselves can generate some of the most valuable and effective solutions for
dealing with our current educational crisis. In fact, if given the right support,
teachers must participate in the work of designing such solutions. Many
individual teachers do this as a matter of course, but the traditional concept of
the individual teacher, acting as hero or saint, crafting educational miracles
within the isolated confines of her own classroom is simply an unrealistic and
unsustainable model for educational success in the twenty-first century. The
future of education depends, in large part, on the ability of educational policy
makers at all levels to reconceptualize the work of teaching in a way that
integrates ongoing, collaborative instructional research and reflection into all
teachers’ routine, professional practice.
By extension, then, teacher evaluation systems must evolve to reflect this
expanded vision of teaching. At present, Oklahoma’s statutory framework for
evaluation does not support this collaborative model of teaching practice, and
the foregoing analysis illustrates the kind of legal gymnastics that school
244. See app. C hereto.
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districts could be required to perform if they meet with challenges to their
efforts to transform their schools into professional learning communities under
the current statutory scheme.
In order to facilitate the development of collaborative teaching practices, the
state legislature should clarify the relationship between evaluation criteria and
the grounds on which school districts can terminate the contracts of ineffective
teachers. Likewise, the legislature should replace the trial de novo provision
in the Teacher Due Process Act with a more deferential standard of review in
order to enable school districts to terminate the contracts of teachers who
cannot or will not adapt constructively to meet today’s educational challenges.
N. Georgeann Roye
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APPENDIX A
OKLAHOMA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 210. STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
CHAPTER 20. STAFF
SUBCHAPTER 3. EVALUATION: MINIMUM CRITERIA
FOR EFFECTIVE TEACHING AND
ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE
210:20-3-4. Oklahoma minimum criteria for effective teaching performance
(a) Practice.
(1) Teacher management indicators. Teacher management indicators are:
(A) Preparation - The teacher plans for delivery of the lesson relative to
short-term and long-term objectives.
(B) Routine - The teacher uses minimum class time for non-instructional
routines thus maximizing time on task.
(C) Discipline - The teacher clearly defines expected behavior (encourages
positive behavior and controls negative behavior).
(D) Learning Environment - The teacher establishes rapport with students
and provides a pleasant, safe and orderly climate conducive to learning.
(2) Teacher instructional indicators. Teacher instructional indicators are:
(A) Establishes Objectives - The teacher communicates the instructional
objectives to students.
(B) Stresses Sequence - The teacher shows how the present topic is related
to those topics that have been taught or that will be taught.
(C) Relates Objectives - The teacher relates subject topics to existing
student experiences.
(D) Involves All Learners - The teacher uses signaled responses,
questioning techniques and/or guided practices to involve all students.
(E) Explains Content - The teacher teaches the objectives through a variety
of methods.
(F) Explains Directions - The teacher gives directions that are clearly stated
and r elated to the learning objectives.
(G) Models - The teacher demonstrates the desired skills.
(H) Monitors - The teacher checks to determine if students are progressing
toward stated objectives.
(I) Adjusts Based On Monitoring - The teacher changes instruction bases
on the results of monitoring.
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(J) Guides Practice - The teacher requires all students to practice newly
learned skills while under the direct supervision of the teacher.
(K) Provides for Independent Practice - The teacher requires students to
practice newly learned skills without the direct supervision of the teacher.
(L) Establishes Closure - The teacher summarizes and fits into context what
has been taught.
(b) Products.
(1) Teacher product indicators. Teacher product indicators are:
(A) Lesson Plans - The teacher writes daily lesson plans designed to achieve
the identified objectives.
(B) Student Files - The teacher maintains a written record of student
progress.
(C) Grading Patterns - The teacher utilizes grading patterns that are fairly
administered and based on indentified criteria.
(2) Student achievement indicators. Student achievement indicators include:
Students demonstrate mastery of the stated objectives through projects, daily
assignments, performance and test scores.
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APPENDIX B
OKLAHOMA ADMINISTRATIVE CODE
TITLE 210. STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
CHAPTER 20. STAFF
SUBCHAPTER 29. STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
AND CONDUCT FOR TEACHERS
210:20-29-1. Purpose
(a) The standards of conduct for teachers in this Subchapter are
adopted pursuant to HB 1017, 70 O.S. Supp. 1990 § 6-101.21 and
6-101.22.
(b) Teachers are charged with the education of the youth of this State.
In order to perform effectively, teachers must demonstrate a belief
in the worth and dignity of each human being, recognizing the
supreme importance of the pursuit of truth, devotion to
excellence, and the nurture of democratic principles.
210:20-29-2. Mission statement
In recognition of the magnitude of the responsibility inherent in
the teaching process and by virtue of the desire for the respect and
confidence of their colleagues, students, parents, and the
community, teachers are to be guided in their conduct by their
commitment to their students and their profession.
210:20-29-3. Principle I: Commitment to the students
(a) The teacher must strive to help each student realize his or her
potential as a worthy and effective member of society. The
teacher must work to stimulate the spirit of inquiry, the
acquisition of knowledge and understanding, and the thoughtful
formulation of worthy goals.
(b) In fulfillment of the obligation to the student, the teacher:
(1) Shall not unreasonably restrain the student from independent
action in the pursuit of learning,
(2) Shall not unreasonably deny the student access to varying points
of view,
(3) Shall not deliberately suppress or distort subject matter relevant
to the student's progress,
(4) Shall make reasonable effort to protect the student from
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conditions harmful to learning or to health and safety,
(5) Shall not intentionally expose the student to embarrassment or
disparagement,
(6) Shall not on the basis of race, color, creed, sex, national origin,
marital status, political or religious beliefs, family, social or
cultural background, or sexual orientation, unfairly
(A) Exclude any student from participation in any program
(B) Deny benefits to any students
(C) Grant any advantage to any student,
(7) Shall not use professional relationships with students for private
advantage,
(8) Shall not disclose information about students obtained in the
course of professional service, unless disclosure serves a
compelling professional purpose and is permitted by law or is
required by law.
210:20-29-4. Principle II: Commitment to the profession
(a) The teaching profession is vested by the public with a trust and
responsibility requiring the highest ideals of professional service.
(b) In order to assure that the quality of the services of the teaching
profession meets the expectations of the State and its citizens, the
teacher shall exert every effort to raise professional standards,
fulfill professional responsibilities with honor and integrity,
promote a climate that encourages the exercise of professional
judgment, achieve conditions which attract persons worthy of the
trust to careers in education, and assist in preventing the practice
of the profession by unqualified persons.
(c) In fulfillment of the obligation to the profession, the educator
(1) Shall not in an application for a professional position deliberately
make a false statement or fail to disclose a material fact related to
competency and qualifications,
(2) Shall not misrepresent his/her professional qualifications.
(3) Shall not assist any entry into the profession of a person known to
be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant
attribute,
(4) Shall not knowingly make a false statement concerning the
qualifications of a candidate for a professional position,
(5) Shall not assist an unqualified person in the unauthorized practice
of the profession,
(6) Shall not disclose information about colleagues obtained in the
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course of professional service unless disclosure serves a
compelling professional purpose or is required by law,
(7) Shall not knowingly make false or malicious statements about a
colleague,
(8) Shall not accept any gratuity, gift, or favor that might impair or
appear to influence professional decisions or actions.
210:20-29-5. Principle III
(a)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(b)
(c)
(d)

(1)
(2)

A career teacher may be dismissed or not reemployed for:
Willful neglect of duty;
Repeated negligence in performance of duty;
Mental or physical abuse to a child;
Incompetency;
Instructional ineffectiveness;
Unsatisfactory teaching performance; or
Any reason involving moral turpitude.
Subject to the provisions of the Teacher Due Process Act, a
probationary teacher may be dismissed or not reemployed for
cause.
A teacher convicted of a felony shall be dismissed or not
reemployed unless a presidential or gubernatorial pardon has been
issued.
A teacher may be dismissed, refused employment or not
reemployed after a finding that such person has engaged in
criminal sexual activity or sexual misconduct that has impeded the
effectiveness of the individual's performance of school duties. As
used in this subsection:
"Criminal sexual activity" means the commission of an act as
defined in Section 886 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes,
which is the act of sodomy; and
"Sexual misconduct" means the soliciting or imposing of criminal
sexual activity. [70:6-101.22]
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APPENDIX C

State-by-State Standards of Review for Termination of Tenured
Teacher Contracts
* Indicates that a school board’s termination decision must rest on an independent hearing
officer’s or panel’s findings, unless the record does not, in the school board’s assessment,
support those findings.
† Indicates that a school board technically does not render a termination decision; the statutory
regime authorizes qualified hearing officers or another agency to make the initial termination
decision, after receiving the school board’s recommendation of termination.

State

Standard of Review

Underlying Statute(s)

Judicial Application

Alabama

Initial review
conducted by hearing
officer under de novo
standard.

ALA. CODE § 16-2410 (LexisNexis 2001
& Supp. 2009).

Ex parte Wilson, 984
So. 2d 1161 (Ala.
2007).

Alaska

“[J]udicial review
based on the
administrative
record.” Prior de novo
review provision
repealed. See Act of
May 18, 1996, ch. 31,
§ 14, 1996 Alaska
Sess. Laws 11.

ALASKA STAT. §
14.20.180 (2008).

Linstad v. Sitka Sch.
Dist., 863 P.2d 838
(Alaska 1993)
(applying the pre1996 review
standard).

Arizona

Initial review
conducted by state
personnel board under
“arbitrary, capricious
or otherwise contrary
to law” standard.

ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15-543
(2009); see also ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. §
41-785(c) (2004 &
Supp. 2009).

Winters v. Ariz. Bd.
of Educ., 83 P.3d
1114 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2004).

Arkansas

Arbitrary or capricious
standard.

ARK. CODE ANN. § 617-1510 (2007).

Allen v. Texarkana
Pub. Sch., 794
S.W.2d 138 (Ark.
1990).

California †

“Independent review,”
effectively equivalent
to de novo standard.

CAL. EDUC. CODE §§
44944-44945 (West
2006 & Supp. 2010).

Governing Bd. v.
Haar, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d
744 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
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Underlying Statute(s)

Judicial Application

Colorado *

“[A]rbitrary or
capricious or legally
impermissible”
standard.

COLO. REV. STAT. §
22-63-302 (2009).

Bd. of Educ. v.
Flaming, 938 P.2d
151 (Colo. 1997).

Connecticut *

Whether board acted
“unreasonably,
arbitrarily, illegally, or
in abuse of its
discretion,” with
deference to board
regarding reasonable
legal conclusions.

CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §10-151 (West
2002 & Supp. 2009);
see also CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 4-183(j)
(West 2007).

Rogers v. Bd. of
Educ., 749 A.2d 1173
(Conn. 2000).

Delaware

Substantial evidence
standard.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
14, § 1414 (2007).

Lehto v. Bd. of Educ.,
962 A.2d 222 (Del.
Super. Ct. 2008).

Florida

“The determination of
the district school
board shall be final as
to the sufficiency or
insufficiency of the
grounds for
termination of
employment.”

FLA. STAT. ANN. §
1012.33(3)(f) (West
2004 & Supp. 2010).

Webber v. Sch. Bd.,
444 So. 2d 70 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984).

Georgia

Arbitrary or capricious
standard invoked
under case law; de
novo standard
expressly precluded
by statute.

GA. CODE ANN. §§
20-2-940(f), 20-21160(e) (West 2007).

Brawner v. Marietta
City Bd. of Educ.,
646 S.E.2d 89 (Ga.
Ct. App. 2007).

Hawaii

Clearly erroneous
standard applies to
factual matters; de
novo to conclusions of
law. Mixed questions
merit deference to
agency expertise.

HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 302A-608 to
-609 (West 2008); see
also HAW. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 91-14(f)-(g)
(West 2008).

White v. Bd. of Educ.,
501 P.2d 358 (Haw.
1972); see also
Peroutka v. Cronin,
179 P.3d 1050 (Haw.
2008).

Idaho

No appeal to state
courts from local
school board decisions
not involving alleged
constitutional due
process violations or
other matters deemed
appealable by statute.

IDAHO CODE ANN. §§
33-513, 33-515 (2008
& Supp. 2009).

Daw ex rel. Daw v.
Sch. Dist. 91 Bd. of
Trs., 41 P.3d 234
(Idaho 2001).
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Standard of Review

Underlying Statute(s)

Judicial Application

Illinois †

“Contrary to the
manifest weight of the
evidence” standard.

105 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/24-12, 5/2416 (West 2006).

Bd. of Educ. v. Ill.
State Bd. of Educ.,
577 N.E.2d 900 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1991).

Indiana

Abuse of discretion,
arbitrary or capricious,
substantial evidence,
or “in accordance with
law” standard.

IND. CODE ANN. § 2028-7-6 (LexisNexis
2007).

Fiscus v. Bd. of Sch.
Trs., 509 N.E.2d 1137
(Ind. Ct. App. 1987).

Iowa

Initial review
conducted by
adjudicator under
abuse of discretion,
arbitrary or capricious,
or “preponderance of
the competent
evidence” standard.

IOWA CODE ANN. §
279.17 (West 1996 &
Supp. 2010).

Walthart v. Bd. of
Dirs., 694 N.W.2d
740 (Iowa 2005).

Kansas †

Arbitrary or capricious
or substantial evidence
standard, or review to
ensure decision was
within hearing
officer’s “scope of
authority.”

KAN. STAT. ANN. §§
72-5438, 72-5443
(2002 & Supp. 2009).

Dees v. MarionFlorence Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 408, 149
P.3d 1 (Kan. Ct. App.
2006).

Kentucky †

Substantial evidence
standard.

KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 161.790 (West 2006
& Supp. 2009).

Gallatin County Bd.
of Educ. v. Mann, 971
S.W.2d 295 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1998).

Louisiana

Abuse of discretion,
arbitrary or capricious,
or substantial evidence
standard.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 17:443 (2001 &
Supp. 2010).

Leban v. Orleans
Parish Sch. Bd., 20070571 (La. App. 4 Cir.
11/21/07); 972 So. 2d
376.

Maine

No statutory tenure,
though tenure may be
locally negotiated.
Substantial evidence
standard applies to
factual matters;
“reversible error” to
legal matters.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 20-A,
§§ 13201-13202
(2008).

Wright v.
Superintending Sch.
Comm., 331 A.2d 640
(Me. 1975).
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Underlying Statute(s)

Judicial Application

Maryland

Initial review
conducted by state
board of education
under de novo
standard.

MD. CODE ANN.,
EDUC. § 6-202 (West
2002 & Supp. 2009).

Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs
v. James, 625 A.2d
361, 370, 381 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1993).

Massachusetts

Initial review
conducted by
arbitration panel,
which must consider
“the best interests of
the pupils . . . and the
need for elevation of
performance
standards.”

MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
71, § 42 (LexisNexis
2002).

Sch. Dist. v. Geller,
755 N.E.2d 1241
(Mass. 2001).

Michigan

Initial review
conducted by
administrative law
judge, who must
review for “significant
evidence proving that
the teacher is unfit to
teach.”

MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 38.104 (West
2005); see also §
MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 24.285 (West
2004).

Lewis v. Bridgman
Pub. Sch., 760
N.W.2d 242 (Mich.
Ct. App. 2008).

Minnesota

De novo standard
expressly disavowed
and more limited
review standards
invoked under case
law.

MINN. STAT. ANN. §
122A.40 (West 2008
& Supp. 2010); see
also MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 572.12(c)
(West 2000)

Moe v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 696, 623
N.W.2d 899 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001).

Mississippi

No tenure, but judicial
review allowed under
arbitrary or capricious
or substantial evidence
standard or for
“violation of some . . .
right.”

MISS. CODE ANN. §§
37-9-101, 37-9-113
(West 1999 & Supp.
2009).

Bowden v. Lawrence
County Sch. Dist.,
2005-CA-01462COA, 2004-CC00556-SCT (Miss. Ct.
App. 2007); 948 So.
2d 487.

Missouri

Substantial evidence
standard applies to
factual matters; a more
stringent standard
applies to legal
matters, but with “due
weight . . . to the
[agency’s]
expertness.”

MO. ANN. STAT. §
168.120 (West 2000).

Hellmann v. Union
Sch. Dist., 170
S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2005).
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Underlying Statute(s)

Judicial Application

Montana

Initial review
conducted by county
superintendent under
de novo standard;
clearly erroneous
standard on appeal to
district court.

MONT. CODE ANN. §
20-4-204 (2007).

Yanzick v. Sch. Dist.
No. 23, 641 P.2d 431
(Mont. 1982).

Nebraska*

“[W]hether the school
board acted within its
jurisdiction and
whether there is
sufficient evidence . . .
to support its
decision.”

NEB. REV. STAT. §§
79-832, 79-841
(2008).

Boss v. Fillmore
County Sch. Dist. No.
19, 559 N.W.2d 448
(Neb. 1997).

Nevada

Appeal conducted “in
the manner provided
by law for appeals of
administrative
decisions of state
agencies.”

NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 391.3194
(West 2006); see also
NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 233B.135
(West 2008).

Unavailable.

New Hampshire

Initial review
conducted by state
board of education
under clearly
erroneous standard.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 189: 14-a to 14-b
(LexisNexis 2006 &
Supp. 2009).

In re Dunlap, 604
A.2d 945 (N.H.
1991).

New Jersey

Initial review
conducted by state
commissioner of
education under
unspecified standard;
state-level agency
receives judicial
deference.

N.J. STAT. ANN. §
18A: 28-5 (West 1999
& Supp. 2008).

Capodilupo v. Bd. of
Educ., 528 A.2d 73
(N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1987).

New Mexico

Initial review
conducted by
independent arbitrator
under de novo
standard.

N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
22-10A-25 (West
2003).

Unavailable.

New York †

Initial decision
rendered by hearing
officer or arbitration
panel; decision is final
unless procured by
statutorily prohibited
means.

N.Y. EDUC. LAW §
3020-a (McKinney
2009); see also N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 7511
(McKinney 1998 &
Supp. 2010).

Lackow v. Dep’t of
Educ., 859 N.Y.S.2d
52 (App. Div. 2008).
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Judicial Application

North Carolina*

Reviewing court may
overturn school
board’s decision if it
was the product of
“wrongful procedure.”

N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 115C-325(h)-(n)
(West 2000 & Supp.
2008); see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §
150B-51 (West 2009).

Farris v. Burke
County Bd. of Educ.,
559 S.E.2d 774 (N.C.
2002).

North Dakota

“Legally sufficient”
standard applies to
determination of
cause; abuse of
discretion standard to
factual matters.

N.D. CENT. CODE §
15.1-15-08 (2003 &
Supp. 2009).

Dobervich v. Cent.
Cass Pub. Sch. Dist.
No. 17, 302 N.W.2d
745 (N.D. 1981).

Ohio*

Reviewing court may
overturn school
board’s decision if it is
“against the weight of
the evidence.”

OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3319.16
(LexisNexis 2004).

Katz v. Maple
Heights City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ.,
622 N.E.2d 1 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1993).

Oklahoma

De novo standard.

70 OKLA. STAT. § 6101.27 (2001).

Weston v. Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 35, 2007
OK 61, 170 P.3d 539.

Oregon

Initial review
conducted by state
dismissal review board
under “[u]nreasonable,
arbitrary, or clearly . . .
excessive” standard.

OR. REV. STAT. §
342.905 (2009).

Bergerson v. SalemKeizer Sch. Dist., 144
P.3d 918 (Or. 2006).

Pennsylvania

Initial review
conducted by state
superintendent of
public instruction
under de novo
standard.

24 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 11-1131 to 1132 (West 1992 &
Supp. 2009).

Katruska v.
Bethlehem Ctr. Sch.
Dist., 767 A.2d 1051
(Pa. 2001).

Rhode Island

Initial review
conducted by state
department of
elementary and
secondary education
under unspecified
standard.

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1613-4 (1996 & Supp.
2006).

Barber v. Exeter-W.
Greenwich Sch.
Comm., 418 A.2d 13
(R.I. 1980).

South Carolina

Substantial evidence
standard.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 5925-480 (2004).

Laws v. Richland
County Sch. Dist. No.
1, 243 S.E.2d 192
(S.C. 1978).
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Underlying Statute(s)

Judicial Application

Statute calls for trial
de novo; however, for
schools, state supreme
court equates this
standard with abuse of
discretion or arbitrary
or capricious standard.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 13-46-6 (2004).

Hicks v. GayvilleVolin Sch. Dist., 2003
SD 92, 668 N.W.2d
69.

Tennessee

Arbitrary or capricious
standard generally; a
modified de novo
standard applies to
alleged “violation[s]
of statutory or
constitutional rights.”

TENN. CODE ANN. §
49-5-513(g) (2009).

Lee v. Franklin
Special Sch. Dist. Bd.
of Educ., 237 S.W.3d
322 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2007).

Texas*

Initial review
conducted by state
commissioner of
education under
arbitrary or capricious,
substantial evidence,
or “unlawful”
standard.

TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. §§ 21.259,
21.301, 21.303
(Vernon 2006).

Matthews v. Scott,
268 S.W.3d 162 (Tex.
App. 2008).

Utah

Arbitrary or capricious
standard.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§
53A-8-104 to -105
(West 2004 & Supp.
2009)

Brough v. Bd. of
Educ., 463 P.2d 567
(Utah 1970).

Vermont

Review standard
ambiguous; not de
novo.

VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
16, § 1752 (2004).

Burroughs v. W.
Windsor Bd. of Sch.
Dirs., 446 A.2d 377
(Vt. 1982).

Virginia*

Abuse of discretion,
arbitrary or capricious,
or substantial evidence
standard.

VA. CODE ANN. §§
22.1-313 to -314
(2006 & Supp. 2009).

Russell County Sch.
Bd. v. Anderson, 384
S.E.2d 598 (Va.
1989).

Washington*

Clearly erroneous
standard applies to
factual matters; de
novo standard to legal
sufficiency of
“cause.”

WASH. REV. CODE
ANN.
§§ 28A.405.310,
28A.405.340 (West
2009).

Weems v. N. Franklin
Sch. Dist., 37 P.3d
354 (Wash. 2002).
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Underlying Statute(s)

Judicial Application

Initial review
conducted by
administrative law
judge under arbitrary
or capricious standard.

W. VA. CODE ANN. §
18A-2-8 (LexisNexis
2007); see also W.
VA. CODE ANN. §§
6C-2-3 to -4
(LexisNexis 2006 &
Supp. 2009).

Graham v. Putnam
County Bd. of Educ.,
575 S.E.2d 134
(W.Va 2002).

Wisconsin

Tenure abolished after
Dec. 21, 1995; review
of dismissals limited
to alleged violations
of collective
bargaining
agreements, statutes,
or constitutional due
process.

WIS. STAT. ANN. §§
118.22-.23 (West
2004).

Fortney v. Sch. Dist.,
321 N.W.2d 225
(Wis. 1982).

Wyoming*

Abuse of discretion or
arbitrary or capricious
standard.

WYO. STAT. ANN. §
21-7-110 (2009); see
also WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 16-3-114
(2009).

Palmer v. Bd. of Trs.,
785 P.2d 1160 (Wyo.
1990).

